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THE PSYCHIC COST OF TAX EVASION 
KATHLEEN DELANEY THOMAS* 
Abstract: Each year, the government loses hundreds of billions of dollars in 
tax revenue due to underreporting by individual taxpayers. According to 
standard deterrence theory, policymakers should be able to reduce tax evasion 
by increasing tax penalties, raising the audit rate, or some combination of the 
two. This Article refers to these strategies as increasing the “monetary cost” of 
tax evasion. To date, budgetary limitations and political hurdles have made 
these strategies difficult for the government to employ. There is, however, an-
other potential means by which the government can improve tax compliance, 
apart from raising the monetary cost of evasion. Empirical evidence shows 
that people experience some form of psychological discomfort when they are 
dishonest, which may deter them from cheating. This Article proposes em-
ploying subtle behavioral interventions that encourage more honest tax report-
ing by raising the level of psychological discomfort experienced from un-
derreporting. I refer to this approach as increasing the “psychic cost” of tax 
evasion. Adopting measures designed to increase the psychic cost of tax eva-
sion, such as making small adjustments to the way that taxpayers fill out their 
tax forms, could generate much needed tax revenue. Moreover, these 
measures would impose very little administrative expense to the government 
as compared to traditional deterrence mechanisms like audits and penalties. 
While further empirical research is needed to test how to increase the psychic 
cost of tax evasion in the most cost-effective manner, this Article proposes a 
roadmap for beginning that process. 
INTRODUCTION 
There is untold wealth in America—especially at income tax time. 
—Anonymous 
For many individuals, cheating on one’s taxes is perfectly rational.1 
The overall odds of being audited are quite low2 and the penalty for un-
____________________________________________________________ 
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Peter Barnes, Al Brophy, Patricia Bryan, John Coyle, Brian Galle, David Gamage, Deborah Ger-
hardt, Andrew Hayashi, Leandra Lederman, Gary Lucas, Richard Meyers, Jason Oh, Leigh Osof-
sky, Gregg Polsky, Erin Scharff, Nancy Staudt, Courtney Thomas, Larry Zelenak, and the partici-
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derreporting is typically just a fraction of the tax owed.3 It should come as 
no surprise, then, that many taxpayers cheat. But this creates an expensive 
problem. Individual tax evasion costs the government over $250 billion in 
lost revenue per year, before taking into account revenue lost by corporate 
tax shelters or legal tax loopholes.4 This is troubling in any economy, but is 
particularly problematic in light of the current budget deficit. 
Why, then, does the government not invest more resources in cracking 
down on individual tax evasion? Standard deterrence theory indicates that 
tax compliance can be improved by raising the expected monetary cost of 
evasion to taxpayers. This expected cost is a simple function of the proba-
bility of detection and the fine for evasion: If the government makes it more 
likely that an individual will be caught cheating or more expensive if that 
individual is caught, then she should be less likely to cheat. For example, a 
rational actor would not evade $100 of taxes if she had a fifty percent 
chance of incurring a $400 penalty (expected penalty of $200) or a five per-
cent chance of incurring a $4,000 penalty (same).5 Thus, according to deter-
                                                                                                                           
 1 This is particularly true of individuals who generate income not subject to any third-party 
reporting, such as a small business owner who earns self-employment income. Underreporting 
income that is not reported by third parties (e.g., a bank reporting on a Form 1099 or an employer 
reporting on a W-2) can be incredibly difficult for the IRS to detect. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T AC-
COUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1014, TAX GAP: THE STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE GAP 
SHOULD INCLUDE OPTIONS FOR REDUCING SOLE PROPRIETOR NONCOMPLIANCE, REPORT TO THE 
SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE 12 (2007) [hereinafter “GAO STRATEGY”]. 
 2 On average, the IRS audits about one percent of individuals each year. See IRS, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE FISCAL YEAR 2013 ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE RESULTS 2, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/PUP/newsroom/FY%202013%20Enforcement%20and%20Service%20Results
%20--%20WEB.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PG9W-2CCH (noting individual audit rate for 
2013 was 0.96%). The chance of being audited, however, varies depending on individual charac-
teristics. For example, individuals who are self-employed and not subject to third-party withhold-
ing on their business income have an overall audit rate closer to three percent. See GAO STRATE-
GY, supra note 1, at 23. Nevertheless, even for individuals that are audited, there is no guarantee 
that the IRS will detect unreported income. 
 3 A typical civil tax penalty for underreporting is twenty percent of the tax due. See, e.g., 
I.R.C. § 6662(a), (b)(1) (2012) (negligence penalty). The Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) also 
provides for a seventy-five percent civil fraud penalty, as well as criminal fines and other criminal 
sanctions. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6663, 7201–7203 (2012). These more serious measures, however, 
are rarely applied. For example, in 2013, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) asserted over 
700,000 accuracy-related civil penalties (generally twenty percent of the tax owed) against indi-
viduals, trusts, and estates, compared to less than 4000 civil fraud penalties. See IRS, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK 2013, at 42–43 (2013). The number of cases referred for criminal 
prosecution by the IRS was just 4364. Id. at 44–45.  
 4 See Tax Gap for Tax Year 2006, IRS, 2 (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/
overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5D2W-DCGV (estimating that individu-
als underreported $235 billion in income taxes and $57 billion in self-employment taxes in 2006, 
the most recent year studied by the IRS). 
 5 This example is somewhat oversimplified. For example, it ignores risk aversion, which 
many standard deterrence theory models account for. Varying levels of risk aversion would cause 
some individuals to behave more cautiously than others even if penalties and audit rates remained 
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rence theory, policymakers should be able to reduce tax evasion by raising 
the audit rate, increasing tax penalties, or some combination of both. 
At first blush, it is puzzling why the government has not employed this 
seemingly obvious strategy. The answer, in large part, is because it is not 
necessarily cost-effective from the government’s perspective. Audits can 
require relatively large amounts of time and financial resources,6 and rais-
ing the audit rate beyond its current level is generally seen as politically 
infeasible. Increasing tax penalties imposes more subtle costs, but many 
scholars have argued that increasing penalties much beyond their current 
levels is cost prohibitive due to both high administrative costs (such as in-
creased litigation) and the potential “crowding out” of voluntary compli-
ance.7 
But there is another cost to tax evasion incurred by taxpayers, which 
may provide a more promising means by which the government can im-
prove tax compliance. Apart from the potential monetary costs, individuals 
may also experience some form of psychological discomfort when they are 
dishonest, which may deter them from cheating. This discomfort—we might 
think of it as guilt—imposes an additional utility cost not accounted for by 
the standard deterrence model. I refer to this cost as the “psychic cost” of 
tax evasion, and argue that it should be factored into our understanding of 
the taxpayer’s cost-benefit analysis along with the monetary costs. 
The idea that guilt might deter people from cheating is not new. The 
tax literature has long recognized that individual ethics play some role in 
tax compliance. But past scholarship has portrayed honesty as a fixed per-
sonal characteristic, generally assuming that individuals are either inherent-
ly honest or dishonest. Recent empirical studies by psychologists and be-
havioral economists, however, have demonstrated that individual honesty is 
actually a malleable trait, influenced heavily by environmental factors. While 
a minority of individuals are completely honest in all circumstances (even if 
it would be economically advantageous to lie), and a minority of individuals 
are dishonest whenever it financially benefits them, most fall somewhere in 
                                                                                                                           
constant. See, e.g., Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Presumptive Collection: A Prospect Theory Ap-
proach to Increasing Small Business Tax Compliance, 67 TAX L. REV. 111, 124 n.82 (2013). 
 6 For every tax dollar collected, the IRS estimates that it spends $0.006 on average. Joel 
Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration, in 3 HANDBOOK OF 
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1449 (A.J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds., 2002). Some audits, however, will 
inevitably be more costly than others. For example, auditing a taxpayer with a cash-based business 
may consume a lot of time and resources because the taxpayer may be unable to provide reliable 
or accessible paper documentation of income and expenses. 
 7 See infra notes 16–37 and accompanying text. 
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the middle of the spectrum and may or may not cheat depending on the cir-
cumstances.8 
Notably, the level of expected monetary gain derived from cheating is 
not the sole factor in the decision to be honest (contrary to what deterrence 
theory would predict), nor is it the most influential. Rather, researchers have 
identified several non-economic factors that influence the decision to be 
honest.9 First, individuals tend to be more honest when they pay attention to 
their own moral standards at the time of decision-making. For example, 
subjects who were asked to recall the Ten Commandments before complet-
ing a task cheated significantly less at that task than controls, regardless of 
how many Commandments they could recall and regardless of their reli-
gious beliefs.10 The results of the study suggest that the mere act of having 
to think about the Ten Commandments influenced subjects’ honesty. 
Secondly, individuals tend to be less honest when they are able to justi-
fy their actions to themselves as something other than cheating (a process 
referred to as “categorization”).11 Psychologists have posited that this ten-
dency stems from two competing desires: the desire to obtain economic 
benefits from cheating and the desire to maintain one’s self-concept as an 
honest person.12 Because individuals experience discomfort when they act 
contrary to their self-concept, they tend not to cheat unless they can con-
vince themselves that what they are doing is not really cheating. For exam-
ple, people might be more willing to take office supplies from an employer 
than to take the equivalent amount of cash (although there is no economic 
difference) because they can categorize the former as something other than 
stealing. 
Third, individuals tend to be more honest when they perceive that there 
is a victim who will be directly harmed by their dishonesty. For example, 
studies show that subjects cheat less when they are told that their financial 
payoff will reduce the payoff to a counterparty, as compared to when there 
is no counterparty.13 However, the unselfish motive diminishes as the wealth 
____________________________________________________________ 
 8 See, e.g., Uri Gneezy, Deception: The Role of Consequences, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 384, 391–
92 (2005); Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Mainte-
nance, 45 J. MARKETING RESEARCH 633, 642–43 (2008); Nina Mazar & Dan Ariely, Dishonesty 
in Everyday Life and Its Policy Implications, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 117, 117–18 
(2006). 
 9 Although this Article will focus on three factors for which there is a substantial amount of 
empirical support, this list of factors that influence honesty is by no means exhaustive. 
 10 See infra notes 77–98 and accompanying text. 
 11 See Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 634–35. 
 12 See id. at 634. 
 13 See Gneezy, supra note 8, at 385. 
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of the counterparty increases (e.g., people are more accepting of employees 
cheating employers than vice versa).14 
This Article applies these three empirical findings to taxpayer behavior 
and argues that policymakers should use this evidence regarding individual 
honesty to reduce tax evasion. I begin by proposing a simple theoretical 
model of tax compliance that supplements the standard deterrence model by 
accounting for the psychic cost of tax evasion. I then argue that the three 
factors described above should be incorporated into our understanding of 
the psychic cost of cheating. For example, paying attention to moral stand-
ards should be seen as increasing the psychic cost of tax evasion (resulting 
in less cheating) while categorizing dishonest behavior as acceptable should 
be seen as decreasing the psychic cost of tax evasion (resulting in more 
cheating). The latter half of this Article then focuses on the tax policy im-
plications of this approach. 
By understanding the psychic cost of tax evasion as malleable, rather 
than a fixed trait of a particular taxpayer, this cost becomes another policy 
tool—along with audits and penalties—that can be utilized by the govern-
ment in an effort to increase tax compliance. In the same way that raising 
penalties or increasing the audit rate would make the expected monetary 
cost of evasion higher for taxpayers (thus improving compliance), undertak-
ing policies designed to raise the psychic cost of tax evasion could have a 
similar impact. The core argument of the Article is that the government 
should raise the psychic cost of tax evasion by employing subtle behavioral 
“nudges”15 that encourage taxpayers to be more honest. For example, the 
IRS might incorporate brief statements on income tax returns that are de-
signed to call attention to the taxpayer’s moral standards. More honesty in 
tax reporting equates to more tax revenue raised. Moreover, adopting 
measures to increase the psychic cost of tax evasion should impose a rela-
tively small administrative cost to the government compared to expending 
resources to audit more taxpayers, and should avoid the crowding out ef-
fects and other costs imposed by high penalties. 
This Article makes a unique contribution to the existing tax literature 
by identifying the psychic cost of tax evasion as an additional policy tool 
that can and should be exploited by the government to improve tax compli-
ance. It then offers realistic tax policy applications for the existing behav-
ioral economics literature on honesty. While further empirical research is 
____________________________________________________________ 
 14 It also diminishes as the payoff to the cheating party increases, suggesting that rational 
forces still come into play, notwithstanding the presence of a victim. See id. at 391. 
 15 See generally RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2d. ed. 2009) (coining the term “nudge” to describe 
modest behavioral interventions). 
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needed to test how to implement behavioral nudges in the most cost-effective 
manner, this Article proposes a roadmap for beginning that process. 
To be clear, this Article is aimed only at intentional tax evasion by in-
dividuals when the relevant law is unambiguous. For example, the behav-
ioral interventions suggested herein would be aimed at a taxpayer who wins 
cash income at a casino, is aware that it is reportable, but is contemplating 
not reporting it. This Article is not intended to reach taxpayers who employ 
legal avoidance strategies or those who take an aggressive but legally de-
fensible position with respect to a murky area of law. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the standard deter-
rence model of tax compliance, along with some of the existing literature on 
non-economic factors that contribute to tax compliance. Part II describes 
the results of recent empirical research on honesty, which reveal that hones-
ty tends to be a malleable and context-specific trait in most individuals. Part 
III proposes a simple tax compliance model that supplements the standard 
deterrence model by incorporating a “psychic cost” to evading taxes and 
argues that we must understand this psychic cost as one that varies based on 
external factors. Part IV explores the policy implications of a tax compli-
ance model that incorporates a psychic cost of tax evasion. It argues that the 
government can and should take steps to increase this psychic cost through 
behavioral nudges, and offers concrete policy recommendations for doing 
so. It then addresses potential objections to those proposals.  
I. ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC THEORIES OF TAX COMPLIANCE 
Current tax compliance policies in the U.S. are based, in large part, 
upon standard deterrence theory. This Part provides a brief overview of that 
theory and examines some additional, non-economic compliance theories 
proposed by tax scholars. By asserting that tax evasion should be under-
stood as imposing a psychic cost, this Article does not advocate abandoning 
standard deterrence theory, but rather supplementing it with an updated un-
derstanding of the non-economic factors that encourage individuals to com-
ply with their tax liability. 
A. Standard Deterrence Theory: The Rational Actor Model 
Standard deterrence theory, as applied to tax compliance, assumes that 
taxpayers are rational actors seeking to maximize their expected utility.16 
____________________________________________________________ 
 16 The rational model was famously applied in the legal arena by Gary Becker, who hypothe-
sized that rational actors decide whether to comply with the law by weighting the expected fines 
from noncompliance against the expected benefit of noncompliance. Gary S. Becker, Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176–79 (1968). Becker’s work was 
subsequently extended to the tax law by Michael Allingham and Agnar Sandmo, whose work has 
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Accordingly, a taxpayer who is deciding whether to comply with the tax law 
will weigh the expected cost of tax evasion against the cost of complying 
and choose the cheaper option.17 The cost of complying is simply the amount 
of tax owed. The cost of evasion, however, is somewhat more complex. If a 
taxpayer evades and is caught, she will have to pay the tax owed and will 
also have to pay a penalty, which is usually some fraction of the tax owed 
(e.g., twenty percent). Together, this penalty added to the tax owed can be 
thought of as the total fine for evasion (F). There is a chance, however, that 
the IRS will not detect the taxpayer’s evasion, in which case the taxpayer 
incurs no cost. Thus, the expected cost of tax evasion is the total fine for 
evasion discounted by the probability of detection (P):18 
Cost of Compliance = Tax Owed 
v. 
Expected Cost of Evasion = P x F19  
For example, if the probability of detection were one percent (which is the 
current overall audit rate)20 and the penalty for evasion were twenty percent 
of the tax due, the expected cost of evading $100 of tax would be the $100 
of tax due plus a $20 penalty (F = $120), discounted by one percent chance 
of being detected (P). The resulting $1.20 expected cost would be substan-
tially cheaper than the cost of complying (i.e., the $100 of tax owed). In that 
case, a rational taxpayer would cheat. 
                                                                                                                           
become the dominant model of tax compliance for both economists and legal scholars. See Mi-
chael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUB. 
ECON. 323, 323–24 (1972). 
 17 See Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 16, at 324. 
 18 Id. The Allingham-Sandmo model assumes probability of detection p, tax rate r, declared 
income of X, and actual income of W. If the taxpayer’s evasion is discovered, she will have to pay 
tax on the undeclared amount (W – X) at some penalty rate f, which is higher than r. The individu-
al will choose X so as to maximize utility (U): 
E[U ] = (1 – p)U(W – rX) + pU(W – rX – 𝑓(W – X)). 
Shlomo Yitzhaki subsequently updated this model by pointing out that the penalty in most systems 
is based on the underpayment of tax, not unreported income. See Schlomo Yitzhaki, A Note on 
Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 3 J. PUB. ECON. 201, 201–02 (1974). 
 19 This is a simplified version of the Allingham-Sandmo model. See supra note 18. The Al-
lingham-Sandmo model dictates that the expected utility of the evasion decision is the sum of the 
expected benefit if not detected plus the expected cost if detected, and both of these are measured 
by reference to the taxpayer’s total wealth, W. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Most 
versions of the model also assume a risk-averse taxpayer, whereas the above model assumes risk 
neutrality for the sake of simplicity and brevity. The Allingham-Sandmo model also simplifies the 
true “costs” of tax evasion. For example, there may be additional monetary costs imposed on a 
taxpayer besides tax penalties and the tax due, such as the costs of undergoing an audit or hiring a 
lawyer. 
 20 See supra note 2 and accompany text. 
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A policymaker seeking to deter a rational taxpayer from evading tax 
can do so by raising the expected cost of evasion, with the goal of making it 
more expensive than the cost of compliance. It follows from the model that 
raising either the probability of detection or the penalty for evasion, or some 
combination of the two, can increase the expected cost of evasion. In the 
context of tax compliance, this means higher tax penalties, raising the audit 
rate, or finding some other method to increase the rate of detection. 
At first glance, raising tax penalties appears to be a simple and poten-
tially cost-effective solution for increasing tax compliance. Current civil tax 
penalties in the United States range from just twenty percent to seventy-five 
percent of the tax due,21 resulting in sub-optimal expected penalties if the 
risk of detection is small.22 If Congress increased nominal penalties signifi-
cantly, it could potentially deter tax evasion without investing more re-
sources in ferreting out noncompliant taxpayers. 
Raising tax penalties, however, presents a number of hurdles. First, at a 
one percent rate of detection, optimal penalties would have to be set at more 
than ninety-nine times the tax evaded.23 Such a departure from the current 
status quo is likely to be politically infeasible.24 Moreover, costs associated 
with significantly increasing nominal penalties counsel against such an ap-
proach. Extremely high tax penalties would likely be perceived as unfair in 
the case of inadvertent errors, and may be perceived as disproportionate 
even in the case of intentional evasion.25 In fact, harsh penalties may actual-
____________________________________________________________ 
 21 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. In reality, the twenty to seventy-five percent pen-
alty rates understate the true amount of the “fine” for noncompliance, because most taxpayers will 
likely incur some additional costs such as interest and/or advisor fees if they contest the penalty. 
 22 In the example in the text above, the expected penalty for evading $100 of tax was just 
$1.20 when the risk of detection was one percent and the penalty was twenty percent. 
 23 See Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1453, 1468 n.77 (2003). To see why this is so, consider again the taxpayer who is considering 
evading $100 of tax. For the expected cost of evasion to outweigh the cost of compliance ($100), 
the nominal penalty would have to be more than $9900 ([$9900 + $100 (tax owed)] x 0.01 (chance 
of detection) = $100). 
 Most versions of the rational actor model assume some level of risk aversion, which places an 
effective ceiling on penalties. See Daniel Shaviro, Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. 
Legal Response to Corporate Tax Shelters, in TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 229, 239 
(Wolfgang Schon ed., 2008). For example, although a risk-neutral taxpayer would need to incur a 
$9900 penalty to be deterred from evading $100 of tax with a one percent chance of detection, a 
risk-averse taxpayer might be sufficiently deterred at a lower penalty. Taxpayers, however, are 
generally not thought to be so risk-averse that they would be deterred by current penalty levels 
(0.2 to 0.75 of the tax) at a risk of detection of only one percent. See, e.g., Terrance Chorvat, Trust 
in Taxation, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 210 (McCaffery & Slemrod eds., 2006); Sanjit 
Dhami & Ali l-Nowaihi, Why Do People Pay Taxes? Prospect Theory Versus Expected Utility 
Theory, 64 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 171, 172 (2007). 
 24 See Lederman, supra note 23, at 1466; Thomas, supra note 5, at 124. 
 25 Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 
43 (2007). 
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ly result in lower tax compliance if they foster resentment in taxpayers and 
“crowd out” their intrinsic motivations to comply.26 Higher tax penalties 
may also impose greater administrative costs, as there may be more proce-
dural hurdles before the IRS could assert them,27 more resources expended 
by the government in prosecuting them,28 and more costs incurred by tax-
payers in contesting them. Finally, at a certain level, high penalties will be-
come uncollectible to the extent that they exceed taxpayers’ resources. 
Given the obstacles to raising tax penalties, the government might in-
stead focus on increasing the probability of detection, which could be 
achieved by increasing the audit rate or the thoroughness of current audits. 
But such a strategy would likely face public resentment and political hur-
dles, as evidenced by the backlash against prior efforts by the IRS to boost 
its auditing program.29 Additionally, many view the IRS’s resources as too 
constrained to expand audits significantly.30 
Another method by which the government has increased the rate of de-
tection is through third-party information reporting. The IRS collects infor-
mation about taxpayers from third parties such as employers and financial 
institutions, compiles the data in an internal database, and then electronical-
ly matches the data with information that the taxpayers report on their tax 
returns.31 If the IRS finds a discrepancy in the income reported by the tax-
payer, the taxpayer may be flagged for audit.32 The vast majority of income 
that is reported to the IRS by third parties is also reported accurately by tax-
payers on their tax returns (approximately ninety-two percent),33 which is 
consistent with standard deterrence theory. Because the rate of detection for 
____________________________________________________________ 
 26 See Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 107 ECON. J. 
1043, 1044–45 (1997); Alex Raskolikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target 
Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 704 (2009). 
 27 For example, applying a relatively new forty percent strict liability penalty for tax shelters 
requires special procedures such as managerial approval. See I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6) (2012); IRS LB&I 
Directive, IRS, Guidance for Examiners and Managers on the Codified Economic Substance Doc-
trine and Related Penalties (Jul. 15, 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Guidance-for-
Examiners-and-Managers-on-the-Codified-Economic-Substance-Doctrine-and-Related-Penalties, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Q5NB-83T2. 
 28 See Slemrod, supra note 25, at 43. 
 29 The unpopularity of the Taxpayer Measurement Compliance Program (“TCMP”), an inten-
sive series of audits conducted by the IRS for research purposes, is a prime example. The TCMP 
was formally abandoned in 1995, due in part to its cost and in part because of the perception that 
the audits were overly-intrusive. See Joseph M. Dodge & Jay Soled, Debunking the Basis Myth 
Under the Income Tax, 81 IND. L.J. 539, 563 (2006). 
 30 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-151, TAX GAP: IRS COULD SIGNIFICANT-
LY INCREASE REVENUES BY BETTER TARGETING ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES 1 (Dec. 2012). 
 31 Id. at 4. For example, when a taxpayer receives a Form 1099 from a bank showing interest 
income, the IRS also receives the information from the bank. 
 32 See id. 
 33 See Tax Gap for Tax Year 2006, supra note 4, at 3 (noting an eight percent noncompliance 
rate for amounts subject to substantial information reporting). 
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evading taxes on such income is extremely high, the expected cost of evad-
ing taxes on that income is also high. Accordingly, if more types of income 
could be subject to third-party information reporting, compliance could be 
improved.34 The bulk of underreported income, however, arises out of 
transactions for which there are no viable third-parties to report to the IRS, 
such as a cash sale between a retailer and a consumer.35 For these types of 
transactions, which make up a substantial portion of the tax gap,36 the IRS 
must find an alternative means to promote better compliance. 
The standard deterrence model provides a powerful mechanism by 
which the government can improve compliance, namely, by making evasion 
more costly for the taxpayer. Although nominal tax penalties have remained 
fairly stable over the past several decades,37 policymakers have had great 
success in enhancing tax compliance by increasing the rate of detection for 
some types of income, largely through third-party information reporting. 
Most of the tax gap, however, is attributable to noncompliance among indi-
viduals where information reporting is not feasible. Moreover, as discussed 
above, increasing penalties or auditing more individuals are not viable solu-
tions to decreasing tax evasion. Thus, to improve tax compliance, policy-
makers may need to look outside of the standard deterrence model. As will 
be discussed in Part IV, adopting behavioral nudges that increase the psy-
chic cost of tax evasion may prove to be an additional method to make eva-
sion more costly to taxpayers while minimizing expense to the government. 
B. Non-Economic Theories of Tax Compliance 
Although tax compliance policies in the United States are largely mod-
eled on deterrence theory, many tax scholars have argued that non-economic 
factors play an additional, important role in tax compliance. A common 
thread in this literature is that norms—either social or personal—influence 
tax compliance decisions. Social norms relate to taxpayers’ perceptions of 
____________________________________________________________ 
 34 See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is 
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1759 (2010). 
 35 See id. at 1752–53; Thomas, supra note 5, at 113. 
 36 See Thomas, supra note 5, at 113. 
 37 Under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, accuracy penalties ranged from five percent for 
negligence to fifty percent for fraud. See DEP’T OF TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON 
PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 21 (Oct. 1999). Penalties 
were strengthened in the 1980s (twenty percent for negligence and seventy-five percent for fraud), 
but the rates have remained relatively stable since. See id. at 24, 26–27. The most recent move-
ment in civil penalties has occurred in the realm of tax shelters, where rates have climbed from 
twenty percent to forty percent of the tax due over the past two decades. See Kathleen DeLaney 
Thomas, The Case Against a Strict Liability Economic Substance Penalty, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
445, 445–47, 449–54 (2011). Although most penalty rates have not increased in recent decades, 
there are more penalties in the tax code than in previous years and the IRS collects more revenue 
from penalties than it did previously. See DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra, at 19, 51. 
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whether other taxpayers are compliant. Personal norms involve one’s indi-
vidual sense of right and wrong. This Section discusses the effect of both 
social norms and personal norms on tax compliance.38 Although the two 
theories may be interrelated, this Article focuses on personal norms—also 
referred to as “taxpayer honesty” herein.  
This Article seeks to draw attention to taxpayer honesty because past 
legal scholarship has devoted more attention to understanding how social 
norms relate to tax compliance,39 with relatively little attention paid to per-
sonal norms. While many scholars have recognized that personal norms 
play some role in tax compliance, they have been described as a “black 
box”—something we cannot understand because we cannot get inside the 
heads of taxpayers.40 Thus, research and policy recommendations have tend-
ed to focus more on cultivating social norms. Yet, there does not appear to 
be a strong empirical case for favoring appeals to social norms over person-
al norms. 
For example, in a recent IRS survey, eighty-six percent of respondents 
surveyed cited “personal integrity” as having the greatest amount of influ-
ence on their tax compliance decisions, as compared to twenty-two percent 
citing belief that their neighbors are honest.41 Additionally, as discussed 
____________________________________________________________ 
 38 This is by no means an exhaustive list of factors outside of standard deterrence theory that 
may influence tax compliance. For example, some scholars have suggested that taxpayers are 
more likely to cheat if they believe that the tax burden is unfairly distributed, that the government 
has treated them unfairly, or that other taxpayers are unfairly advantaged. See, e.g., James Andre-
oni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 850–51 (1998); Marjorie Kornhauser, A Tax 
Morale Approach to Compliance: Recommendations for the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599, 614–15 
(2007); Slemrod, supra note 25, at 39. In a similar vein, others have theorized that compliance is 
higher when taxpayers approve of how the government spends their tax dollars. See, e.g., Andre-
oni et al., supra, at 851; Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support 
for Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179, 179–81 
(2013); Slemrod, supra note 25, at 39. Additionally, taxpayers’ subjective perceptions about the 
probability that they will be audited or the fines they will incur may play a role in their compliance 
decisions. See Andreoni et al., supra, at 844–46 (discussing studies showing that taxpayers overes-
timate the probability of audit). Additionally, framing effects (i.e., whether taxpayers are claiming 
a refund or owe a balance) have also been found to play a role in tax compliance. See Paul Corco-
ro & Peter Adelsheim, A Balance Due Before Remittance: The Effect on Reporting Compliance, in 
RECENT RESEARCH ON TAX ADMINISTRATION AND COMPLIANCE: SELECTED PAPERS GIVEN AT 
THE 2010 IRS RESEARCH CONFERENCE 107, 109 (Martha Eller Gangi & Alan Plumley eds., 
2010). 
 39 See infra notes 44–55 and accompanying text. 
 40 Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111, 137–38 
(2009). 
 41 IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, 2012 TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY 14 (Feb. 2013) [hereinafter 
“TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY”]. Forty percent of respondents reported fear of audit as having a 
great amount of influence. Id. Of four factors presented to participants (personal integrity, fear of 
audit, third-party reporting, and belief that neighbors are paying), the one that most people indi-
cated had “no influence” on their compliance decisions was belief that neighbors are paying hon-
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below, a number of empirical studies have indicated that appeals to con-
science can have a positive impact on tax compliance,42 and that feelings of 
moral obligation have more influence on compliance decisions than fear of 
social stigma.43 Further, as discussed in Part II, a growing body of recent 
research has shed light on the “black box” of personal norms that can pro-
vide useful insight into what drives taxpayer honesty. 
1. Social Norms 
A number of scholars have posited that tax compliance is partly at-
tributable to social norms.44 Adherence to social norms generally describes 
a desire to reciprocate the good behavior of others45 or to send a positive 
signal to others.46 If there is a social norm of tax compliance, then individu-
als will be more likely to comply because their neighbors are complying. 
Such norms may deter tax evasion if taxpayers perceive a threat of social 
stigma from violating the norm.47 
There have been a number of empirical studies of the effect of appeals 
to social norms on tax compliance. For example, one frequently cited study 
conducted by the Minnesota Department of Revenue examined whether tax-
payers would be positively influenced by the knowledge that other individ-
uals are highly compliant.48 To that end, the authors of the study sent a letter 
to a group of taxpayers informing them that the vast majority of individuals 
                                                                                                                           
estly (thirty-seven percent, compared to two percent saying personal integrity had no influence). 
Id. 
 One limitation of survey studies such as the Taxpayer Attitude Survey, however, is that they 
assume that taxpayers give honest or otherwise reliable responses as to what actually drives their 
tax compliance decisions. It is possible, for example, that some respondents cite personal integrity 
as the most influential factor because they fear doing otherwise would make them appear dishon-
est. However, the fact that personal integrity has been the most influential factor “by far” in multi-
ple studies of different groups of respondents (the IRS reports annual results from 2005–2012) 
indicates that it is likely a significant factor in taxpayers’ compliance decisions. See id. at 6, 14. 
 42 See, e.g., infra notes 58, 64 and accompanying text. 
 43 See, e.g., infra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 44 See, e.g., Andreoni et al., supra note 38, at 850–52; Doran, supra note 40, at 131; Korn-
hauser, supra note 38, at 612–17; Lederman, supra note 23, at 1468–69; Slemrod, supra note 25, 
at 38–41. 
 45 See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 71, 81 (2003) (arguing that individuals are more likely to comply if they believe 
that other taxpayers are compliant, and vice versa). 
 46 See Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA L. REV. 
1781, 1819 (2000). But cf. Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Pos-
ner’s Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 367–69 (2002). 
 47 See Harold G. Grasmick & Wilbur J. Scott, Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Con-
trol: A Comparison with Grand and Petty Theft, 2 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 213, 215 (1982). 
 48 See, e.g., STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX 
COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS 5, 18 (1996). 
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comply with their tax obligations.49 The authors reported a “modest” im-
provement in tax compliance among taxpayers who received the letter,50 
although authors of a subsequent study of the same data concluded that the 
impact was not statistically significant.51 In a similar study conducted in 
Australia, taxpayers who were informed about high compliance rates were 
less likely to overstate non-work related deductions, but there was no effect 
on work-related deductions.52 Another field study conducted in Switzerland 
examined the effect of a normative appeal (again, through a letter) on the 
timeliness of filing and paying, as opposed to the amount reported.53 That 
study found that the normative appeal had no significant effect on the time-
liness of taxpayers’ returns or payment.54 
Despite mixed results in the data, the idea that social norms encourage 
tax compliance has been a relatively popular theory among tax scholars, a 
number of whom have made policy recommendations aimed at cultivating 
these norms.55 Others, however, have expressed skepticism that social norms 
affect compliance because tax return information is confidential and gener-
ally cannot be observed by others.56 Arguably, individuals cannot respond 
to a social norm to comply with their tax liability without the threat of a 
social sanction for violating it.57 
____________________________________________________________ 
 49 Id. at 5–6. To compare the effect of the normative appeal with the effect of standard deter-
rence measures, another group of taxpayers received a letter informing them that they were likely 
to be audited. Compliance generally improved among this risk-of-audit group. See id. at 2–3, 10–
12. 
 50 Id. at 25. 
 51 See Marsha Blumenthal et al., Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence 
from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 125, 132 (2001). 
 52 See Michael Wenzel, Misperceptions of Social Norms About Tax Compliance: From Theo-
ry to Intervention, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 862, 877–78 (2005). 
 53 Benno Torgler, Moral Suasion: An Alternative Tax Policy Strategy? Evidence from a Con-
trolled Field Experiment in Switzerland, 5 ECON. GOV. 235, 239 (2004). The letter attempted to 
highlight the “closeness” of the local community (by explicitly mentioning the number of resi-
dents) and the relationship of trust between the government and the community. Id. at 240–41. 
 54 Id. at 250. 
 55 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 45, at 83–84; Kornhauser, supra note 38, at 602; Lederman, 
supra note 23, at 1501; Susan Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Foundation Under High Penalty 
Regimes, 44 CONN. L. REV. 675, 735–36 (2012). 
 56 See, e.g., Doran, supra note 40, at 135–37; Kahan, supra note 46, at 378. 
 57 See, e.g., Doran, supra note 40, at 135–37; Stephen Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax 
Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1083 (2003). While federal tax return information is con-
fidential, many states make individual taxpayer noncompliance public in an effort to “shame” such 
individuals and promote compliance. See Joshua D. Blank, What’s Wrong with Shaming Corpo-
rate Tax Abuse? 62 TAX L. REV. 539, 539–43 (2009). 
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2. Personal Norms 
In addition to attributing compliant behavior to social norms, scholars 
have also recognized that taxpayers are likely driven by an internal motiva-
tion to comply, arising out of one’s innate sense of honesty, ethics, or civic 
obligation.58 These intrinsic motivations, sometimes called “personal norms,” 
have also been the subject of a number of empirical studies. In one seminal 
field experiment, researchers compared the effect of “appeals to conscience” 
on a group of taxpayers to the effect of the threat of legal sanctions on an-
other group.59 Both groups were interviewed during the month prior to the 
filing of their returns and asked questions intended to emphasize certain 
motives for payment.60 For example, members of the “sanctions” group were 
asked about their opinion regarding the severity of various sanctions for tax 
evasion. The “conscience” group was asked questions such as whether citi-
zens have an obligation to the government and whether one should feel 
guilty for not paying their taxes.61 In cooperation with the IRS, the authors 
subsequently examined changes in tax compliance among the treated groups 
for the year under study by examining tax return information.62 While both 
treated groups demonstrated an improvement in tax compliance, the con-
science appeal had a much stronger effect than the threat of sanctions, with 
a mean increase in income reported of $804 in the conscience group63 as 
compared to $181 in the sanctions group.64 
Another study surveyed individuals to compare the effects of legal 
sanctions, social stigma, and guilt on tax compliance.65 Participants were 
asked about past tax noncompliance and whether they expected to be non-
compliant in the future. To gauge the effect of different sources of deter-
rence, the participants responded to questions regarding their views on the 
likelihood of legal sanctions for tax evasion, whether they believed the peo-
____________________________________________________________ 
 58 See, e.g., Andreoni et al., supra note 38, at 850; Doran, supra note 40, at 132; Michael W. 
Spicer, Civilization at a Discount: The Problem of Tax Evasion, 39 NAT’L TAX J. 13, 16 (1986). 
 59 Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, Appeals to Conscience, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 274, 
284 (1967). 
 60 Id. at 285–88. 
 61 Id. A placebo group was given a basic interview without any “accentuation questions,” 
while a fourth group served as an untreated control. Id. at 288. 
 62 By providing compliance data on a group-wide rather than individual basis, the IRS did not 
violate taxpayer confidentiality. Id. at 285. 
 63 This amount, in 1962 dollars, would be greater today when adjusted for inflation. See id. at 
296. 
 64 Id. at 295. The authors of the study cautioned that “results obtained from the experiment are 
not of a magnitude which uniformly produces statistically significant differences.” Id. at 294. 
There were approximately ninety taxpayers in each group. See id. at 285. 
 65 See Grasmick & Scott, supra note 47, at 213–14. Whereas violations of a social norm may 
result in perceived stigma, the authors noted that guilt results from a violation of a personal norm. 
Id. at 215. 
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ple close to them evaded tax, and whether they felt it is “wrong” to evade 
taxes.66 The authors of the study concluded that “[t]he threat of guilt feel-
ings . . . is noticeably greater than the effect of stigma . . . which, in turn, is 
greater than the effect of legal punishment . . . .”67 Another similar survey 
study that also examined the impact of guilt (attributable to personal 
norms), embarrassment (attributable to social norms), and legal sanctions 
on tax compliance found that the effect of guilt was 1.5 times as great as the 
effect of legal sanctions, and that there was no significant effect found from 
embarrassment.68 
Personal versus social rationales for tax compliance are not necessarily 
alternative theories, nor are they likely to be independent of one another. 
For example, a taxpayer’s personal norms may be influenced by her percep-
tions of social norms of tax compliance.69 Once those perceptions of social 
norms have been internalized, however, violations of a taxpayer’s personal 
norms are associated with feelings of guilt and/or discomfort from acting 
outside of one’s own moral code, which should be distinguished from em-
barrassment or fear of social stigma.70 In other words, empirical studies 
showing that personal norms influence compliance suggest that taxpayers 
may comply with their tax liability simply because they believe it is the right 
thing to do. Regardless of whether they believe their neighbors are comply-
ing, some taxpayers may choose not to cheat because doing so would be 
inconsistent with their belief system.71 This may be the case even for tax-
____________________________________________________________ 
 66 Id. at 218. 
 67 Id. at 225. 
 68 Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational 
Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 837, 851–52 (1990). The au-
thors of the study used the term “shame” to describe feelings associated with guilt from violating 
personal norms, a term which others have attributed to violations of social norms. See id. at 846. 
 There have been additional studies finding a link between ethical beliefs and tax compliance, 
as well. See, e.g., Philip M. J. Reckers et al., The Influence of Ethical Attitudes on Taxpayer Com-
pliance, 47 NAT’L TAX J. 825, 825–26 (1994); Dipanker Ghosh & Terry L. Crain, Ethical Stand-
ards, Attitudes Toward Risk, and Intentional Noncompliance: An Experimental Investigation, 14 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 353, 353 (1995). 
 69 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 45, at 81; Kornhauser, supra note 38, at 612; Lederman, supra 
note 23, at 1469–70. 
 70 See, e.g., Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, The Role of Moral Sentiments and Audit 
Perceptions in Tax Compliance, 49 PUB. FIN. 70, 74–76 (1994) (discussing the difference between 
guilt for violating a personal norm versus shame for violating a social norm); Grasmick & Bursik, 
supra note 68, at 840–41 (contrasting feelings of guilt from violating personal norms with feelings 
of embarrassment from violating social norms).  
 71 However, research suggests that certain attitudes may “neutralize” taxpayers’ feelings of 
guilt from tax evasion. For example, people who believe that the government wastes their tax 
dollars may feel less guilt from evading tax than they otherwise would from being dishonest. See 
Quint C. Thurman, Craig St. John & Lisa Riggs, Neutralization and Tax Evasion: How Effective 
Would a Moral Appeal Be in Improving Compliance to Tax Laws? 6 LAW & POL’Y 309, 311 
(1984). 
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payers who perceive that the expected monetary sanction for cheating would 
be very low. 
II. RECENT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON HONESTY 
Psychologists have long recognized that, in addition to responding to 
economic incentives, individuals respond to internalized norms of conduct 
in making decisions.72 These personal norms create in individuals a self-
concept that generally guides their actions.73 For example, most people con-
sider themselves to be honest, and acting according to that self-concept 
would generally result in honest behavior.74 Acting contrary to one’s self-
concept, by being dishonest for example, imposes a psychological cost such 
as guilt or some other feeling of discomfort.75 
In recent years, psychologists have updated our understanding of the 
role of self-concept in honest behavior by examining external factors that 
tend to result in individuals behaving more or less honestly. Although stud-
ies indicate that most people view themselves as honest (i.e., most peoples’ 
self-concept is that they are honest), studies also indicate that, when given 
the opportunity to cheat, most people will cheat by a small amount.76 The 
presence of certain non-monetary external factors, however, appears to 
make it more difficult for individuals to act contrary to their self-concept, 
thus resulting in more honest behavior. Although this is not an exhaustive 
discussion of that research, this Part discusses several of those factors.  
A. Attention to Moral Standards 
One external factor that has been shown to influence honesty is wheth-
er, at the time of decision making, an individual is paying attention to her 
own ethical standards. If a person is not mindful of such standards, presum-
ably she can more easily act contrary to her self-concept without generating 
negative feelings.77 Indeed, studies show that people are more likely to be 
dishonest if they are not asked to think about moral standards. On the other 
hand, when an individual’s moral standards are specifically called to mind 
____________________________________________________________ 
 72 See Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 633. 
 73 Id. at 634. 
 74 Id.; see also SHELLEY DUVAL & ROBERT A. WICKLUND, A THEORY OF OBJECTIVE SELF 
AWARENESS 82 (1972) (describing the tendency of individuals to “avoid the negative affect gen-
erated by [one’s] awareness of a discrepancy between a standard of correctness and the actual 
attitude or behavior”). 
 75 Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 633. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 635. For example, an individual might believe it is wrong to lie, but not think about 
his belief and compare it to his behavior at the time a decision is made. Id. 
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or made salient in some other way at the time of decision-making, individu-
als tend to be more honest.78 
In one lab study of attention to moral standards, a group of subjects 
were asked to recall the Ten Commandments immediately prior to perform-
ing a numeric problem-solving exercise, while a control group was asked to 
recall ten books they had read in high school.79 Subjects had a financial in-
centive to solve as many problems as possible in the allotted time.80 Within 
each of these two groups, an instructor checked the answers of one sub-
group of subjects, which gave them virtually no opportunity to cheat.81 An-
other subgroup of subjects, however, was told to tear up and recycle their 
answer sheet and self-report the number of problems solved, giving them a 
high opportunity to cheat.82 The authors of the study then compared the av-
erage number of problems solved among those who had the opportunity to 
cheat and those that did not. 
In the subgroups that did not have an opportunity to cheat, the average 
number of problems correctly solved was the same whether or not they had 
been asked to recall the Ten Commandments. This was expected, since in-
dividuals in those groups were presumably honest given their low oppor-
tunity to cheat.83 In the subgroups that had an opportunity to cheat, howev-
er, the results were different. The subgroup that was asked to recall ten 
books from high school claimed to have solved more problems than the 
other groups, a likely indicator of cheating.84 On the other hand, the sub-
group asked to recall the Ten Commandments reported the same average 
number of problems solved as the groups with no opportunity to cheat, an 
indicator of honesty.85 Notably, it made no difference if the subject could 
actually recall all or any of the Ten Commandments.86 It appears that the 
mere act of having to think about the Ten Commandments—a proxy for 
moral standards—encouraged people to be more honest. 
Another similar lab study involved the same problem solving task with 
the same no opportunity/high opportunity to cheat conditions. In this study, 
rather than recalling the Ten Commandments, subjects were asked to sign 
____________________________________________________________ 
 78 See id. 
 79 Id. at 635–36. The exercise involved a sheet of twenty matrices made up of three-digit 
numbers between one and ten (e.g., 1.65 or 8.23). Subjects were given four minutes to “solve” as 
many matrices as possible. To solve a matrix, the subject had to find two numbers in the matrix 
that added up to ten. Id. 
 80 Subjects were told two randomly selected participants would receive $10 per matrix solved. 
Id. at 636. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 635. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 The average number recalled was 4.3. Id. 
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an honor code statement before the task.87 Additionally, some subjects were 
paid fifty cents per correct problem while others were paid $2 per correct 
problem.88 The results were similar to the Ten Commandments experiment. 
Subjects who recycled their answer sheets cheated more than those who had 
their answers checked, but among those with the opportunity to cheat, the 
group that signed the honor code cheated significantly less than the group 
that did not.89 Interestingly, among those in the high opportunity group who 
cheated, there was little variation between those who received $2 per prob-
lem and those who received fifty cents per problem, suggesting that the 
change in economic incentive had virtually no impact.90 
The significance of attention to moral standards was further demon-
strated through a field study of actual auto insurance consumers.91 The au-
thors of that study examined whether signing one’s name before reporting 
information, rather than afterwards, would call attention to moral standards 
and induce more honest behavior.92 In cooperation with an auto insurance 
company, the authors used a form that asked customers to self-report the 
odometer mileage of their car and moved the signature line from the bottom 
to the top, so that customers would sign before they reported the number of 
miles.93 Half of the customers received the new form (signature at the top) 
and half received the old form (signature at the bottom).94 A review of 
13,488 forms revealed that customers who signed at the top reported 
10.25% more miles than those that signed at the bottom, suggesting that 
moving the signature line resulted in more honest reporting.95 
The authors of the study reached a similar result in a lab experiment 
that also tested the effect of moving a signature line.96 In the study, which 
involved solving math puzzles for financial compensation, subjects were 
given a tax form to report their earnings (based on the amount of puzzles 
solved) and to claim deductions for travel expenses to the laboratory.97 As 
in the insurance study, subjects who signed the top of the tax form before 
____________________________________________________________ 
 87 Id. at 636–37. 
 88 Id. at 636. 
 89 Id. at 637. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Lisa L. Shu et al., Signing at the Beginning Makes Ethics Salient and Decreases Dishonest 
Self-Reports in Comparison to Signing at the End, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15197, 15198 
(2012), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/109/38/15197.full.pdf+html, archived at https://
perma.cc/7KKN-S2QS?type=pdf. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. Customers have an incentive to underreport the number of miles, because fewer miles 
driven means lower insurance premiums. See id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. This amounted to an average of 2428 more miles per car. 
 96 Id. at 15197–98. 
 97 Id. at 15197. 
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reporting information cheated significantly less than subjects who signed at 
the bottom.98 
B. Ability to Categorize Behavior 
At first blush, it may appear to be a paradox that most individuals con-
sider themselves to be honest,99 yet most people will cheat to some degree 
when given the opportunity to do so.100 This is particularly surprising given 
that individuals generally are averse to acting contrary to their self-concept. 
Studies reveal, however, that individuals tend to adopt strategies to “catego-
rize” dishonest behavior as something other than cheating. Categorization is 
the process by which an individual constructs an internal narrative that al-
lows him to view his behavior as consistent with his self-concept.101 For 
example, if an individual took $1 from a friend’s wallet without asking, he 
might tell himself “I am borrowing this and it will all even out eventually” 
instead of “I have stolen $1.” Doing so might allow the individual to per-
form the dishonest act (taking the $1) without incurring any discomfort 
from acting contrary to his self-concept. 
Some behaviors are more susceptible to categorization than others, and 
psychologists have posited that the presence of certain external factors in-
fluences the degree of that susceptibility. For example, transactions that in-
volve money tend to be less susceptible to categorization while transactions 
that involve some non-monetary medium tend to be more susceptible.102 
Consider for example, the difference between taking $10 in office supplies 
from one’s place of work versus taking $10 from a petty cash box at work. 
____________________________________________________________ 
 98 Id. Unlike the field study of auto insurance customers, the lab environment allowed the 
authors to detect actual cheating on the math puzzles by coding the forms with unique identifiers 
that were undetectable by the participants. Id. With respect to over-claimed income from the math 
puzzles, thirty-seven percent of subjects cheated when they signed at the top compared to seventy-
nine percent when they signed at the bottom. Id. With respect to overstated deductions, those who 
signed at the top reported fewer expenses (average of $5.27) compared to those that signed at the 
bottom (average of $9.62). Id. 
 99 Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 638. In one study, subjects were asked to complete a task 
where some had the opportunity to cheat and some did not. Id. As in other similar studies, perfor-
mance on the task with an opportunity to cheat was higher, suggesting subjects were being dis-
honest. When subjects in both groups were given a personality questionnaire after the task, how-
ever, those who had cheated rated their level of honesty and morality just as highly as those who 
had not. The results suggest that there are circumstances in which individuals do not “update their 
self-concept” despite acting dishonestly. Id. at 638–39. 
 100 See Mazar & Ariely, supra note 8, at 120. Although many subjects cheat in studies in 
which the chance of detection is low or zero, the magnitude of cheating for most subjects is small. 
See id. 
 101 See Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 634; cf. Andrew T. Hayashi, Occasionally Libertarian: 
Experimental Evidence of Self-Serving Omission Bias, 29 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 711, 712–13 
(2013) (finding evidence that individuals select behavioral norms that serve their self-interest). 
 102 See Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 634, 637–38. 
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If neither transaction is authorized, then there is no economic difference 
between the two. But it is not difficult to imagine that an individual who 
would never consider taking the $10 in cash might take the $10 in office 
supplies without a second thought.103 The individual might consider the for-
mer to be “stealing,” but might successfully categorize the latter as some-
thing other than stealing. 
A study of the effect of a non-monetary medium on cheating was con-
ducted using the same problem-solving task as the Ten Commandments 
study.104 The same no opportunity/high opportunity to cheat conditions in-
volving recycled answer sheets and checked answer sheets also applied.105 
In this study, some participants were told they would receive fifty cents per 
correct answer and some were told they would receive a token for each cor-
rect answer, which could be subsequently exchanged for fifty cents.106 Not 
only did participants who had the opportunity to cheat claim to have solved 
more problems than those that did not, but the magnitude was even higher 
among those who were paid in tokens, suggesting that the presence of the 
tokens allowed for “categorization” and induced more dishonest behavior.107 
C. The Presence of a Victim 
A third external factor that appears to influence individuals’ willing-
ness to be dishonest is whether the individual perceives that a victim will be 
harmed by her dishonesty. For example, an individual might not feel guilty 
for telling a lie intended to make someone happy (e.g., “you look nice to-
day”), but might feel guilty for telling a lie that benefits the liar at the ex-
pense of the other party (e.g., “there are no cookies left in the cookie jar”).108 
One study examined the willingness of individuals to lie if the mone-
tary payoff from dishonesty directly decreased the payoff to a counterpar-
ty.109 The experiment involved a game with two players, each of whom did 
not know the identity of the other.110 Player 1 had information about poten-
tial payout scenarios, while Player 2 did not. This allowed Player 1 to ma-
nipulate the outcome by conveying either truthful or untruthful information 
____________________________________________________________ 
 103 Cf. id. at 634 (describing how it is easier for a person to steal a ten cent pencil from a 
friend than to steal ten cents out of a friend’s wallet). 
 104 Supra notes 79–86 and accompanying text. 
 105 Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 638. 
 106 Id. 
 107 See id. The authors of the study note that there are other factors that influence categoriza-
tion, as well, such as the magnitude of dishonesty. See id. at 634–35 (“[I]t may be possible to 
‘stretch’ the truth and the bounds of mental representations only up to a certain point . . . .”). 
 108 See Gneezy, supra note 8, at 385–86. 
 109 See id. at 385. 
 110 Id. at 387. 
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to Player 2.111 If Player 1 lied, she would receive a larger payoff and Player 
2 would receive a smaller payoff.112 When the gain for Player 1 for lying was 
$1 and the loss to Player 2 was also $1, 36 percent of the subjects lied.113 
But when the gain for lying was $1 and the loss to Player 2 was $10, the 
number that lied dropped to seventeen percent, suggesting that subjects 
were less willing to lie as the harm to the other party increased. When the 
gain to Player 1 for lying was $10 and the loss to Player 2 was $10, fifty-
two percent of subjects lied.114 This suggests that, although the harm to a 
counterpart influences individuals’ willingness to lie, increasing economic 
benefits from lying diminish that influence. 
In another study, participants were asked to judge a hypothetical sce-
nario in which an individual selling a car chooses not to disclose knowledge 
of a faulty oil pump that will cost the buyer $250 to repair when discov-
ered.115 Seventy percent of the participants responded that the seller’s action 
was “unfair” and eighteen percent responded that it was “very unfair.”116 
When the scenario was changed so that the buyer would incur $1000 of 
damage (no change in seller’s payoff for selling the car), however, thirty-
two percent responded “unfair” and sixty-six percent responded “very un-
fair.”117 The results again suggest that individuals are less comfortable with 
dishonesty as the harm to another party increases. 
Studies also reveal that individuals’ willingness to lie depends on their 
perception of the wealth of the victim. In general, the wealthier the victim, 
the more acceptable people think it is to be dishonest. For example, subjects 
surveyed thought lying to a lawyer was more acceptable than lying to a law 
student.118 Similarly, subjects considered a lie from an employee (individu-
al) to an employer (bank) to be more acceptable than a lie from the same 
employer to the employee.119 
____________________________________________________________ 
 111 Id. at 386. Player 1 had information about an Option A scenario (e.g., $6 to Player 1 and 
$5 to Player 2) and an Option B scenario (e.g., $5 to Player 1 and $6 to Player 2). Player 1 com-
municated a message to Player 2 about which option was more beneficial (e.g., “Option A will 
earn you more money than Option B”), which was either truthful or not, and Player 2 ultimately 
chose the option with no further information. About eighty percent of Player 2’s followed Player 
1’s suggestion. Id. at 387–88, 392. 
 112 Id. at 387. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 387–88. 
 115 Id. at 389. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 390. 
 118 See Uri Gneezy, Deception: The Role of Consequences 32 (Apr. 8, 2002), http://
www.econ.pitt.edu/seminar_docs/uri.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9W7R-3K57?type=pdf. 
 119 Id. at 30–32. 
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III. A NEW THEORY OF THE PSYCHIC COST OF TAX EVASION 
Although some legal scholars have recognized that personal norms in-
fluence tax compliance, personal norms have received relatively little atten-
tion in the tax literature. This Part argues that violating personal norms im-
poses a psychic cost that should be incorporated into our understanding of a 
taxpayer’s cost-benefit analysis when making tax compliance decisions. 
Further, the recent empirical work discussed in Part II provides an updated 
understanding of the external factors that influence personal norms. While 
economists have traditionally assumed that the psychic cost of evading tax-
es is a constant function that increases as the amount evaded increases, 
studies have shown that non-monetary factors also influence this psychic 
cost. Accordingly, this Part argues that we should understand the psychic 
cost of tax evasion as one that can be increased or decreased based on fac-
tors such as attention to moral standards, categorization, and the presence of 
a victim. 
A. The Role of “Psychic Cost” in the Standard Deterrence Model 
This Section introduces an updated model of tax compliance that ac-
counts for the psychic cost of tax evasion. It then discusses the limitations 
of the model and the merits of incorporating the concept of psychic costs 
into the standard deterrence model.  
1. The Model 
As discussed above in Part I, standard deterrence theory posits that 
taxpayers make compliance decisions by comparing the expected cost of 
compliance with the expected cost of evasion. In the traditional model, 
these expected costs are monetary, determined by the nominal penalty dis-
counted by the probability of detection.120 If the monetary cost of noncom-
pliance (i.e., the expected penalty) is higher than the tax saved from non-
compliance, then presumably a taxpayer will choose not to evade tax.121 
Research shows, however, that taxpayers also incur non-monetary util-
ity costs when they evade tax. The guilt or psychological discomfort a tax-
payer may feel from violating her personal norms imposes an additional, 
psychic cost of evading taxes.122 Because studies have demonstrated that 
____________________________________________________________ 
 120 The model may also account for risk aversion. See supra notes 5, 23 and accompanying 
text. 
 121 This assumes risk neutrality. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 122 See, e.g., Joseph G. Eisenhauer, Ethical Preferences, Risk Aversion, and Taxpayer Behav-
ior, 37 J. SOCIO-ECON. 45, 48–50 (2008); Joseph G. Eisenhauer et al., Experimental Estimates of 
Taxpayer Ethics, 69 REV. SOC. ECON. 29, 33–34 (2011); Erard & Feinstein, supra note 70, at 74–
76; James P.F. Gordon, Individual Morality and Reputation Costs as Deterrents to Tax Evasion, 
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this psychic cost influences individual decision-making, it should be viewed 
as part of a taxpayer’s overall utility calculus along with expected penalties. 
In its simplest form, we can add an additional cost (call it Z where Z repre-
sents the psychic cost of evasion) to the basic deterrence model and arrive 
at the following cost-benefit comparison for a taxpayer deciding whether to 
comply or evade: 
Cost of Compliance = Tax Owed 
v. 
Expected Cost of Evasion = (P x F) + Z123 
It remains the case that when deciding whether to comply or evade, a tax-
payer will evaluate the utility she derives from paying the full tax as com-
pared to the utility she derives from evading. Under this modified model, 
however, the utility costs of evasion are both the expected penalty she will 
incur (the monetary cost), as well as the additional psychic cost imposed from 
being dishonest. This means that even in cases where the monetary benefit 
of evasion outweighs the expected penalty, taxpayers might choose to com-
ply because the psychic cost is too high. The psychic cost is presumably 
incurred regardless of whether the taxpayer’s evasion is detected, and thus 
is not discounted by P (the probability of detection).124 On the other hand, a 
compliant taxpayer does not incur the psychic cost of dishonesty.125 
2. Defining the Psychic Cost 
One challenge presented by the above simplified model is in defining 
Z.126 Those economists who have addressed the possibility of a psychic cost 
of tax evasion have traditionally assumed that it is a linear function of the 
                                                                                                                           
33 EUR. ECON. REV. 797, 798 (1989); Grasmick & Bursik, supra note 68, at 840; Spicer, supra 
note 58, at 17. 
 123 Where P = the probability of detection and F = the total fine for evasion (tax due + penalty 
due). See supra note 18 and accompanying text. The model assumes that the taxpayer incurs a 
psychic cost for evasion (Z) regardless of whether she is caught. 
 124 It is possible, however, that when some taxpayers are caught and penalized for evasion, the 
sanctions would effectively “crowd out” guilty feelings. For those taxpayers, the psychic cost of 
evasion would only be incurred when tax evasion went undetected and/or was not subject to mon-
etary sanctions. 
 125 Tax compliance could impose other kinds of psychic costs, however, such as those gener-
ated by resentment about having to pay taxes to the government. 
 126 Another potential oversimplification in the model as presented is that it assumes there is 
no interaction between deterrence and the psychic cost of tax evasion. In reality, there could be 
such an interaction. For example, individuals might perceive that the IRS’s efforts to promote 
honesty by increasing the psychic cost of tax evasion are a result of their inability to detect eva-
sion through audits. The result could be lower deterrence accompanied by a higher psychic cost of 
tax evasion (which could offset one another). 
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amount of tax evaded.127 Under such a view, evading more tax imposes a 
higher psychic cost and evading less tax imposes a lower cost. The standard 
presumption has also been that the amount of psychic cost that taxpayers 
incur from cheating is heterogeneous across taxpayers, but not within a tax-
payer.128 
Heterogeneity across taxpayers is to be expected. Different taxpayers 
are bound to have different ethical standards, which may be a product of 
any number of factors such as internalization of social norms, attitudes 
about fairness or government spending, or religious beliefs.129 These varia-
tions in personal norms likely result in taxpayers incurring varying levels of 
psychic cost when they cheat. The traditional assumption in the literature, 
however, has generally been that for each individual taxpayer with her unique 
set of personal norms, the level of psychic cost she incurs when she evades 
her tax liability will vary only based on how much tax she evades.130 
The recent empirical work on honesty, however, calls into doubt this 
assumption that the psychic cost of evasion is fixed within an individual and 
varies only in response to the amount of tax evaded. As discussed above in 
Part II, studies have shown that the presence of certain external factors at 
the time of decision-making can influence an individual’s willingness to be 
dishonest. These factors have been shown to increase or decrease honesty 
without a corresponding increase in monetary incentives or the probability 
of detection.131 Further, the studies indicate that certain of these factors are 
____________________________________________________________ 
 127 See, e.g., Eisenhauer, supra note 122, at 49; Gordon, supra note 122, at 798–99. Erard and 
Feinstein model the utility of cost of guilt from evading taxes as proportional to the ratio of the 
taxpayer’s underpayment (the amount of tax evaded over the amount of tax owed). Erard & Fein-
stein, supra note 70, at 75–76. 
 128 See, e.g., Eisenhauer, supra note 122, at 49; Erard & Feinstein, supra note 70, at 71; Gor-
don, supra note 122, at 801. As is the case with any economic model that assumes a single, ration-
al actor, the assumption of homogeneity is a simplifying one, rather than an intended description 
of the real world. 
 129 See, e.g., Erard & Feinstein, supra note 70, at 76. 
 130 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. In another work modeling a tax compliance 
game with honest and dishonest taxpayers, Erard and Feinstein assume (for purposes of their 
model) that at each level of income, there is a fraction of taxpayers that are “inherently” honest. 
Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game, 25 J. 
ECON. 1, 2–4 (1994). 
 131 Experiments showing the effect of attention to moral standards demonstrated similar ef-
fects when the monetary incentive was constant (e.g., the Ten Commandments Study) and when it 
was manipulated (e.g., the Honor Code study). See Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 635–37. In the 
Honor Code study, there was a substantial change in compliance based upon whether or not sub-
jects signed the honor code, but there was not a significant variation between participants compen-
sated fifty cents per correct problem versus those compensated $2.00. Id. at 636–37. 
 The experiments described in Part II generally involved two variations of the probability of 
detection: high opportunity to cheat (recycled answer sheets) and no opportunity to cheat (answers 
checked). Id. at 635–36. However, other studies have shown little change in dishonesty at varying 
levels of detection. See id. at 640–41. For example, in one study in which participants answered 
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truly “external” in that they appear to be independent of things like social 
norms. For example, informing participants in honesty studies about the 
average number of problems solved by other participants had no effect on 
the number of problems those participants claimed to solve.132 
External factors that encourage honesty can be viewed as raising the 
psychic cost of evasion, while those that result in more dishonesty can be 
viewed as lowering the psychic cost of evasion. Thus, the psychic cost 
should be understood as a cost that increases or decreases depending on the 
presence of factors such as attention to moral standards, categorization, or 
the presence of a victim. These variations will be discussed further in the 
next Section. 
3. Why Model the Psychic Cost? 
The interactions of the various factors that influence the psychic cost 
of tax evasion are likely too complex to express with a simple function.133 Is 
there any benefit, then, to incorporating the psychic cost of tax evasion into 
a simplified deterrence model? Even if we can’t define Z with precision, 
viewing taxpayer dishonesty as imposing a utility “cost” from a cost-benefit 
standpoint is still helpful from a policy perspective. While the idea that per-
sonal norms play some role in tax compliance is fairly uncontroversial, 
those norms may be perceived as too intangible, and their effects too untest-
ed, to have appeal to policymakers. In contrast, audits and penalties impose 
distinct costs, with which we are familiar and can understand from a tradi-
                                                                                                                           
fifty multiple choice questions and were promised ten cents per correct answer, there were four 
different conditions representing different levels of detection for cheating. Id. In the first condition 
(no opportunity), the experimenter checked the answer sheet. In the second condition (some 
chance of detection), the subject graded her own answers but then handed both the test sheet and 
the answer sheet (showing the number of correct answers) to the experimenter at the time of pay-
ment. In the third condition (lower chance of detection), the subject graded her own answers, 
shredded her test sheet, and handed her answer sheet to the experimenter at the time of payment. 
In the fourth condition (no chance of detection), the subject graded her own answers, shredded 
both the answer and test sheets, and paid herself. Although there was significantly less cheating in 
the first condition, the level of cheating in the other three conditions was not significantly differ-
ent. Id.; see Mazar & Ariely, supra note 8, at 119–20.  
 132 See Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 639–40. The study involved the same matrix task in-
volved in the other honesty studies, in which some answers were checked (no opportunity to 
cheat) and some answered sheets were recycled (opportunity to cheat). Additionally, some sub-
jects were correctly informed about the average number of problems correctly solved (4) and some 
were given an exaggerated number (8). Although more subjects cheated in the recycle condition 
than the answers checked condition, there was no significant variation in cheating between those 
told the correct average problems solved and those told the inflated number. The authors conclud-
ed that “[t]his finding argues against drive toward achievement, threshold due to external costs, or 
norm compliance as alternative explanations for our findings.” Id. at 640. 
 133 This is further complicated by the fact that the psychic cost likely varies from person to 
person. 
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tional cost-benefit approach. By viewing dishonesty as imposing another 
“cost” that can be incorporated into a cost-benefit analysis, we can situate 
honesty-based policy recommendations in a context familiar to policymak-
ers, and provide a frame of reference to evaluate and compare such pro-
posals with current compliance initiatives.134 
Further, and more importantly, by understanding the psychic cost of 
tax evasion as malleable, rather than a fixed trait of a particular taxpayer, 
this cost becomes another policy tool—along with audits and penalties—
that can be manipulated by the government in an effort to increase compli-
ance. In the same way that raising fines, expanding information reporting, 
or increasing the audit rate would make the expected cost of evasion higher 
for taxpayers (thus improving compliance), adopting behavioral nudges that 
are designed to raise the psychic cost of tax evasion could have a similar 
impact. These policy implications are explored further in Part IV. 
B. Updating the Model 
Because taxpayer honesty may play a role in tax evasion, it is helpful 
to reexamine the external factors that influence honesty in this context. 
These factors include: drawing attention to moral standards, categorizing 
behavior, and the presence of a victim. This Section explores how these 
three factors relate to taxpayer behavior and evaluates the effect of the fac-
tors on the psychic cost of tax evasion.  
1. Attention to Moral Standards and Tax Evasion 
As detailed in Part II, a number of empirical studies have demonstrated 
that individuals are less likely to cheat if they are paying attention to their 
personal norms at the time that they make the decision whether to be hon-
est. In the context of tax compliance, this means that individuals should be 
less likely to report inaccurately on their tax returns if their moral standards 
are made salient at the time of reporting. 
Policies designed to increase attention to moral standards have been 
shown to reduce cheating without any change in either the opportunity to 
cheat or the financial incentive to cheat. Rather, such policies appear to 
have a purely psychological impact on individuals, outside of the standard 
____________________________________________________________ 
 134 Cf. On Amir et al., Behavioral Economics, Psychology, and Public Policy, 16 MARKETING 
LETTERS 443, 451 (2005) (suggesting the use of behavioral economics to influence policy by 
using “the established path from economics to policy—attempting to modify economics to be 
more descriptively accurate, and from there influencing policy”); Sarah B. Lawsky, How Tax 
Models Work, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1657, 1693 (2012) (contending that economic models cannot pro-
vide certainty to tax policy discussions, but noting that they are important because they help refine 
ideas and shape arguments that enhance policymakers’ understanding of issues).  
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deterrence model of decision-making. Attention to moral standards, then, 
can be viewed as increasing the psychic cost of evasion. In the same way 
that raising audit rates and penalties would make evasion more expensive 
for taxpayers, drawing attention to personal norms appears to make evasion 
more expensive from a utility standpoint. In the context of the model, atten-
tion to moral standards should be viewed as increasing Z in a taxpayer’s 
cost-benefit calculus, where Z represents the psychic cost of tax evasion. 
The empirical data indicates that attention to moral standards may 
have as strong of an impact on honesty as increasing the risk of detection. 
For example, in studies in which subjects performed a problem-solving task 
for a cash reward, recall that subjects claimed to solve twice as many prob-
lems when they had a high opportunity to cheat as compared to when they 
had no opportunity to cheat.135 This difference suggests that risk of detec-
tion clearly plays a significant role in the decision to be honest. When sub-
jects with a high opportunity to cheat signed the honor code, however, they 
reported the same number of correctly solved problems as those who had no 
opportunity to cheat.136 In other words, the honor code diminished cheating 
to the same degree that having an experimenter check the answer sheets did. 
Further, increasing the monetary reward (from $0.50 per correct problem to 
$2 per correct problem) for cheating had virtually no impact among subjects 
who had signed the honor code, suggesting again that attention to moral 
standards increases compliance in a manner that is not accounted for by the 
rational model.137 
The notion that there is more cheating in the absence of attention to 
moral standards is consistent with the relatively high level of tax evasion 
that exists among individuals with a high opportunity to cheat (i.e., those 
who are not subject to third-party information reporting), who in the aggre-
gate report only forty-four percent of their income.138 On a paper version of 
Form 1040, the taxpayer signs a statement at the bottom of the form, under 
penalties of perjury, verifying that the information is accurate.139 Thus, a 
taxpayer presumably will not sign the return until after she has reported her 
total taxable income (calculated by reporting gross income and accounting 
____________________________________________________________ 
 135 See Mazar et al., supra note 8, at 637. Subjects claimed to have solved an average of ap-
proximately three matrices in the control condition in which their answers were checked. Subjects 
who were allowed to throw away their answer sheets without having them checked claimed to 
have solved about six problems on average. Id. 
 136 Id. The average number of matrices that subjects claimed to have solved in the honor code 
condition was approximately three. Id. 
 137 Id. The average number of matrices solved among honor code subjects was 3.1 when the 
reward was $0.50, and 3.0 when the reward was $2. Id. 
 138 See Tax Gap for Tax Year 2006, supra note 4, at 3. 
 139 See IRS, Form 1040 (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/NWZ8-HJSF. 
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for various exemptions, deductions, and credits).140 Similarly, nothing in the 
Instructions to Form 1040 appears designed to call attention to moral stand-
ards before the form is filled out.141 Additionally, the use of electronic filing 
software, signing returns with electronic signatures, and the use of return 
preparers may further aid taxpayers in reporting without having to think 
about their personal norms. 
2. Categorization and Tax Evasion 
Whereas attention to moral standards makes individuals less likely to 
cheat, categorization—the process by which individuals rationalize dishon-
esty—leads to more cheating. If individuals do not consider tax evasion to 
be “cheating” or “stealing”, then they are not forced to update their self-
concept when they evade, making evasion less costly from a utility stand-
point. Thus, categorization effectively decreases the psychic cost of evasion, 
potentially diminishing it to zero (or close to zero) when individuals can 
completely rid themselves of any psychological discomfort from dishonesty. 
In the context of the formal model, categorization should be viewed as re-
ducing Z in a taxpayer’s utility calculus. This is analogous to reducing fines 
or penalties, which would similarly make evasion less costly for taxpayers. 
Categorization likely plays an important role in the low rate of tax 
compliance (less than fifty percent) observed among those taxpayers, such 
as individuals with self-employment income, who have a high opportunity 
to cheat. For example, studies indicate that individuals do not perceive tax 
evasion to be as serious as stealing. One survey study compared attitudes 
about tax evasion with attitudes about petty theft, defined as stealing some-
thing worth less than $20, and grand theft, defined as stealing something 
worth more than $20.142 In the study, subjects were asked to rank the vari-
ous forms of deception as “always wrong, usually wrong, sometimes 
wrong, seldom wrong, or never wrong.”143 While the vast majority of peo-
ple in the study believed that both grand theft (90.2%) and petty theft 
(86.2%) are always wrong, significantly fewer people (61.1%) believed that 
tax cheating is always wrong.144 Other studies have yielded similar results. 
For example, one survey revealed that individuals ranked tax fraud as less 
____________________________________________________________ 
 140 See id. 
 141 See IRS, FORM 1040 INSTRUCTIONS (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/
i1040.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DD45-P67U. Page ninety-five of the current instructions 
does contain information about penalties for misreporting. It is unlikely, however, that this is in-
tended to serve anything other than informational purposes since it is somewhat buried in over 200 
pages of instructions. 
 142 Grasmick & Scott, supra note 47, at 217–18. 
 143 Id. at 218. 
 144 Id. at 221. 
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serious than embezzlement and bribery and that “the typical taxpayer ap-
parently considers tax evasion only slightly more serious than ‘stealing a 
bicycle.’”145 
A simple thought experiment demonstrates categorization in the con-
text of tax evasion with an anecdotally familiar scenario. Consider the fol-
lowing hypothetical: 
Peter is a schoolteacher who considers himself to be a morally 
upstanding citizen. If he is given too much change at a cash regis-
ter, he will point out the error and return it, no matter the amount. 
He once found $20 in an ATM and returned it to the bank. How-
ever, when Peter earns cash from odd jobs on weekends, he never 
reports it on his tax return. 
Peter might categorize keeping the extra change or the money found at the 
ATM as stealing, and simultaneously categorize underreporting his tax lia-
bility as something other than stealing.146 This categorization may occur 
even if the dollar amounts to be gained from the various forms of deception 
are identical. If he categorizes his behavior in such a manner, Peter would 
not be forced to update his self-concept (that he is a morally upstanding 
person) and would not experience psychological discomfort from failing to 
pay tax on the cash from the odd jobs. 
Studies have shown that certain factors, such as the immediacy of a 
cash reward versus a substitute such as a token, can influence the likelihood 
that an individual will re-categorize dishonest behavior as acceptable.147 For 
Peter, the presence of an immediate cash benefit at the cash register or ATM 
might make it harder for him to categorize his actions as honest in those 
scenarios. On the other hand, simply reducing his tax bill (instead of receiv-
ing immediate cash) might make it easier for Peter to categorize not report-
ing the income from the odd jobs as acceptable, akin to the experiments 
showing that people cheat more when dealing with tokens than with cash. 
3. The Presence of a Victim and Tax Evasion 
The empirical data discussed above in Part II also reveals that individ-
uals tend to be more honest when they perceive that another individual will 
be directly harmed by their dishonesty.148 Although the influence of a poten-
____________________________________________________________ 
 145 Young-dahl Song & Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Tax Ethics and Taxpayer Attitudes: A Survey, 
38 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 442, 445 (1978). The vast majority of subjects (87.7%), however, said that 
they disagreed with the following statement: “[S]ince tax dodging hurts no one but the govern-
ment, it is not a serious offense.” Id. 
 146 The example assumes that Peter knows that the income from the odd jobs is reportable. 
 147 See supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text. 
 148 See supra notes 109–117 and accompanying text. 
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tial victim is not entirely divorced from the economic incentive to cheat,149 
individuals appear to incur a psychological cost when their dishonesty in-
flicts economic harm on another party, which makes them less likely to 
cheat even when there is a financial reward for cheating. Thus, a perceived 
victim can be viewed as increasing Z, or raising the psychic cost of tax eva-
sion, in the taxpayer’s cost-benefit analysis. 
For example, in the thought experiment above, Peter might perceive 
that keeping an extra $10 of cash from a store clerk is stealing at the ex-
pense of the storeowner. The psychic cost he might incur from feeling that 
he harmed the storeowner might outweigh his economic incentive to keep 
the $10, causing him to decide to return it. But he might feel that underre-
porting his tax liability by $10 is essentially a “victimless” crime. Or, he 
might feel that the only victim is the government, and that the government 
is too wealthy of a victim to alter his behavior. In either case, he would like-
ly incur a lower psychic cost from “stealing” $10 of tax as compared to 
keeping the $10 in change from the store. 
4. Effect of Honesty Factors on the Psychic Cost of Tax Evasion 
The factors discussed above—attention to moral standards, categoriza-
tion, and the presence of a victim—can be seen as influencing Z, the psy-
chic cost of tax evasion. Although traditional economic analyses of tax eva-
sion tended to view Z as increasing only as the amount of tax evaded in-
creases, an updated understanding of taxpayer behavior indicates that the 
variation in Z is more complex. Specifically, attention to moral standards and 
the presence of a victim likely increase Z, making evasion more costly and 
taxpayers less likely to evade. On the other hand, categorization likely de-
creases Z, making the psychic cost of evasion lower and resulting in more 
evasion. Studies indicate that these factors operate independently from fi-
nancial incentives to cheat, and, in some cases, can be just as powerful of a 
motivator or deterrent. Although the relationship between these factors and 
the psychic cost of tax evasion likely cannot be modeled with precision, it is 
useful to understand how these factors contribute to compliance or evasion 
in the tax context. These relationships are summarized in the table below:150 
____________________________________________________________ 
 149 Individuals display more willingness to cheat at the expense of another as the financial 
reward increases. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 150 Supra notes 135–149 and accompanying text. 
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IV. TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Given that increasing the psychic cost of tax evasion could be a more 
cost-effective approach to improving tax compliance than raising the risk of 
detection or the fine for evasion, the next question is how policymakers 
might go about raising this cost. The empirical work on dishonesty provides 
a broad framework for how external factors influence the psychic cost of 
evasion. The more difficult challenge involves translating this high level 
knowledge of what influences the psychic cost of dishonesty into realistic 
policies designed to improve tax compliance. This Part offers concrete poli-
cy applications for increasing the psychic cost of tax evasion, identifies are-
as for future study, and addresses potential objections to the policy pro-
posals. 
A. Policy Proposals 
In light of empirical evidence indicating that honesty can be induced 
by simple, external measures like signing a form at the top, researchers have 
suggested that the IRS move the signature line to the top of individual tax 
forms.151 Yet, while the notion of having individuals sign tax forms at the 
top rather than the bottom has garnered media attention,152 it does not ap-
pear that the government has been receptive to the suggestion.153 
____________________________________________________________ 
 151 See DAN ARIELY, THE (HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY 47–48 (2012). 
 152 See, e.g., Carmen Nobel, An Easy Trick to Mitigate Tax Cheating, FORBES, Apr. 15, 2013, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2013/04/15/an-easy-trick-to-mitigate-tax-form-
cheating, archived at https://perma.cc/4KSH-DAFK?type=pdf; Dan Ariely, Why We Lie, WALL ST. 
J., May 26, 2012, at C2. 
 153 See ARIELY, supra note 151, at 47–48. 
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The particular challenge presented by incorporating the findings of be-
havioral economics studies into tax policy is how to translate measures that 
successfully induce honesty in laboratories or field experiments into 
measures that will be relevant in the reality of present-day taxpayer behav-
ior. For example, simply moving the signature line on Form 1040 may have 
little or no impact on actual taxpayer compliance for a number of reasons. 
First, the vast majority of taxpayers electronically file their tax returns (sev-
enty-eight percent in 2011),154 which does not require a physical signature 
at all. Additionally, roughly sixty percent of tax returns are prepared by tax 
professionals,155 which would make it even more difficult to build in a 
mechanism at the beginning of the filing process (such as an electronic sig-
nature) to bring moral standards to mind. Further, those individuals with the 
biggest opportunity to cheat—the self-employed, who demonstrate the 
highest levels of evasion—must make estimated tax payments during the 
year, and thus have likely already made the decision whether to cheat by the 
time they file their year-end tax return on Form 1040. 
 Although translating the results of empirical studies into feasible poli-
cy applications is no easy task, this does not mean the government should 
abandon increasing the psychic cost of tax evasion as a policy matter. Rais-
ing the cost of tax evasion through other, more traditional means presents 
other challenges of potentially equal magnitude. Legal scholars have a role 
here to supplement the social science research on dishonesty by helping to 
translate principles (such as attention to moral standards) into practice in a 
manner that reflects realistic taxpayer practices. With that aim, this Section 
offers proposals for behavioral nudges designed to encourage more honest 
tax reporting. 
1. Attention to Moral Standards on Electronic Forms 
Although physically signing a self-prepared Form 1040 may not be 
relevant for most taxpayers, the IRS could incorporate similar mindfulness 
principles into electronic returns. The goal would be to find an electronic 
method of calling moral standards to mind before a taxpayer reported in-
formation on an electronic return. For example, a taxpayer could be prompted 
to check a box confirming that a short statement has been viewed before she 
____________________________________________________________ 
 154 IRS, Top 10 Helpful Features on the IRS Website (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/
uac/Top-10-Helpful-Features-on-the-IRS-Website, archived at http://perma.cc/PEC7-G4SN. 
 155 See Sandra Block, More Taxpayers Are Preparing Their Taxes on Their Own, USA TO-
DAY, Apr. 14, 2010, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/2010-04-14-1Ataxprep14_
CV_N.htm, archived at https://perma.cc/XQ9B-B6QT?type=source (sixty-four percent of tax returns 
filed electronically were prepared by professionals in 2010); IRS, IRS Releases the Dirty Dozen 
Tax Scams for 2012 (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Releases-the-Dirty-Dozen-Tax-
Scams-for-2012, archived at http://perma.cc/F47F-E6SY. 
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can proceed to filling out her electronic form. The statement could be a ver-
sion of the statement on the Form 1040 signature block,156 or contain a 
more concise statement intended to call attention to personal norms against 
tax evasion. For example, it might simply read: “Reporting false or incor-
rect information on a federal tax return, including failing to report income 
that you have earned, is illegal.”157 
It may be the case that electronic signatures (or simply checking a box 
on a computer screen) may not cause individuals to examine their moral 
standards in the same manner that physically signing an identical statement 
would, however. Further research would aid our understanding of this po-
tential nuance in behavior, as discussed below. An additional consideration 
is whether taxpayers would actually read a simple statement such as that 
described in the text above, or whether they would ignore it or become so 
familiar with it that the statement no longer triggered actual mindfulness. To 
mitigate these potential effects, policymakers could keep the statement as 
short as possible, display it prominently and boldly with no surrounding 
text, and vary it from year to year. In the alternative, taxpayers might pay 
more attention if they are required to read and then type out a short jurat in 
order to electronically sign.158 
As another possibility, the IRS could target specific tax items that are 
commonly evaded by taxpayers and institute policies to trigger mindfulness 
among electronic filers with respect to those particular items. A taxpayer 
might have to read a statement and check a box at several points during the 
filing process verifying that they do not have certain types of income or tax 
to report. For example, one commonly evaded159 item is paying employ-
ment taxes on household employees like babysitters, house cleaners, or yard 
maintenance workers.160 For a taxpayer who is considering not reporting 
household employee wages, having to affirmatively indicate that they did 
____________________________________________________________ 
 156 The text immediately above the signature line on Form 1040 reads: “Under penalties of 
perjury, I declare that I have examined this return and accompanying schedules and statements, 
and to the best of my knowledge and belief, they are true, correct, and complete. Declaration of 
preparer (other than taxpayer) is based on all information of which preparer has any knowledge.” 
Supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 157 Statements that highlight the illegality of tax evasion might also deter taxpayers from 
cheating by making the sanctions for noncompliance more salient. 
 158 Requiring taxpayers to type out a jurat before filling out their tax return is analogous to 
requiring witnesses to take an oath before testifying in a judicial proceeding. 
 159 See IRS Notice 2007-35, 2007-15 I.R.B. 940 (“Common Mistakes on Tax Returns”). 
 160 For certain household employees, taxpayers may have to pay social security, Medicare, and 
federal unemployment taxes. See I.R.C. §§ 3111, 3301 (2012). Whether a household worker consti-
tutes a taxable “employee” or an independent contractor depends on a number of factors including, 
but not limited to, the amount paid for the services, the period of time spent working during the year, 
and the amount of control the employer has over the worker’s services. See IRS Publ’n 926, House-
hold Employer’s Tax Guide, 2–3 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p926/ar02.
html, archived at http://perma.cc/5CDV-2DJ3. 
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not have an eligible household employee might impose a higher psychic 
cost than simply omitting the tax liability from their return. Alternatively, 
having to read a statement about the potential penalties that could be im-
posed for failing to report taxes on household employees might similarly 
raise the psychic cost of evading such taxes. Presumably, reminding taxpay-
ers of penalties for cheating would make their personal norms of compli-
ance more salient.161 
For taxpayers filing electronically directly with the IRS, the IRS could 
easily institute such measures. For taxpayers self-preparing with return prepa-
ration software, such as TurboTax, the IRS would have to encourage or 
somehow require the software companies to include the relevant statements 
as part of the filing process on the software. One method of inducement 
might include requiring software companies to present the statements in the 
software (before any information is filled in) as a condition of the govern-
ment accepting electronic filing from those companies.162 
2. Taxpayer Surveys 
Researchers have had success inducing honesty through a number of 
different mechanisms designed to call attention to moral standards, from 
signing forms at the top, to signing honor codes, to the simple act of having 
to recall the Ten Commandments. With this breadth of approaches in mind, 
tax policymakers might also seek to make taxpayers’ moral standards sali-
ent through mechanisms other than electronic signatures, checking boxes to 
“agree” to online statements, or typing out a jurat. 
For example, the IRS might ask taxpayers to fill out a brief survey be-
fore they file an electronic tax return. The survey could be designed to call 
attention to taxpayers’ ethical attitudes about tax evasion. Or, the survey 
could make salient to taxpayers the fact that tax evasion is not a “victim-
less” crime. Calling to mind a potential victim of tax evasion should also 
increase the cost of such evasion, in the same manner that calling attention 
to moral standards would. 
____________________________________________________________ 
 161 Making the monetary sanctions salient might also serve as a deterrent independent of call-
ing attention to the taxpayer’s moral standards. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 162 Tax return preparers would continue to present a challenge. The government could choose 
to focus solely on taxpayers who are currently self-preparers (a significant portion of taxpayers). 
Or, it might institute policies to further encourage self-preparation (for example, by extending free 
software services to a larger number of taxpayers). Another possibility would be to require tax 
return preparers to have their clients sign a statement affirming the truth of the information they 
are providing at the time they turn over their records to the preparer. 
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To complete the survey, taxpayers might be asked to rate the degree to 
which they disagree or agree with brief statements163 such as: (i) “it is moral-
ly wrong to underreport one’s tax liability, no matter how small the amount,” 
(ii) “it is a crime to underreport one’s tax liability, no matter how small the 
amount,” or (iii) “tax evasion results in honest taxpayers having to pay 
higher taxes.” 
To induce taxpayers to fill out the survey immediately before they file 
their tax return, the IRS might offer free e-filing software to taxpayers who 
complete the survey.164 Alternatively, the IRS might offer a few dollars of 
tax credit (applied against the taxpayer’s balance due or added to the tax-
payer’s refund) for any taxpayer who fills out the survey. Additionally, the 
IRS could induce software companies such as TurboTax to include the sur-
vey at the beginning of the software program by making it a condition of 
accepting electronic filing. Finally, the survey could be included along with 
paper returns to be filled out by hand and mailed in with the completed re-
turn. 
3. Targeting Self-Employed Taxpayers 
In considering policies designed to increase the psychic cost of tax 
evasion, policymakers would be well-advised to focus on the group of tax-
payers with the highest rate of noncompliance: the self-employed. Self-
employed individuals earn income that is generally not subject to third-
party withholding or information reporting and, as a group, are estimated to 
report less than half of their tax liability to the IRS.165 Income earned by 
cash-based businesses is particularly easy to conceal from the IRS.166 The 
____________________________________________________________ 
 163 The format could be modeled after the Taxpayer Attitude Survey, which asks taxpayers to 
indicate whether they “Completely Agree”; “Mostly Agree”; “Mostly Disagree”; or “Completely 
Disagree” with a number of statements. See TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY, supra note 41, at 13. 
 164 Currently, all taxpayers can file their return electronically with the IRS free of charge, but 
only taxpayers with adjusted gross income under $60,000 can also access free software to help them 
prepare their returns. See IRS, Free File: Do Your Taxes for Free (last visited Feb. 22, 2015), 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Free-File:-Do-Your-Federal-Taxes-for-Free, archived at http://perma.cc/
VNL5-4HPZ. The IRS might waive the adjusted gross income ceiling for any taxpayer who fills out 
the survey. Although this may require the government to compensate the software companies that 
offer the filing software (e.g., TurboTax), the cost could be offset by compliance gains resulting 
from the survey. A more cost-effective solution might be for the federal government to develop its 
own tax preparation software that it could provide for free to taxpayers. This would give the IRS a 
significant degree of control over compliance mechanisms like taxpayer surveys that are designed 
to induce honesty. 
 165 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 166 See Thomas, supra note 5, at 115 n.32. 
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IRS estimates that failure to report self-employment income costs the gov-
ernment $179 billion in unpaid tax each year.167 
Unlike employees whose taxes are withheld by employers, self-em-
ployed taxpayers generally must submit quarterly estimated tax payments to 
the IRS during the year or face a penalty.168 To avoid the penalty, the esti-
mated payments must total ninety percent of the current year’s tax liability 
(four payments of 22.5%) or one hundred percent of the previous year’s 
liability (four payments of 25%).169 Presumably, self-employed taxpayers 
who intend to underreport their business income to the IRS take this inten-
tion into account when they make their estimated tax payments and un-
derreport on those payments accordingly.170 
For example, a storeowner who expects to owe $100,000 of tax for a 
particular year could make estimated tax payments totaling $90,000 (ninety 
percent of $100,000) during the year to avoid an estimated tax penalty. But 
if the storeowner plans to report only $50,000 of his $100,000 in tax liabil-
ity, then he would likely make estimated tax payments totaling just $45,000 
(ninety percent of $50,000). 
Suppose now that our storeowner was exposed to one of the above-
described mindfulness policies. For example, suppose the storeowner paid 
$45,000 of estimated tax during the year, and then when he self-prepared 
his Form 1040 in April, he was required to fill out a short survey inquiring 
about his attitudes regarding tax evasion. It is possible that the survey 
would make the psychic cost of underreporting his business income signifi-
cantly higher, but it is also likely that the storeowner feels pre-committed to 
the tax evasion he has already engaged in during the estimated tax process. 
The storeowner has paid estimated taxes on only $50,000 of tax liability 
($45,000 in estimated tax representing ninety percent of $50,000), yet he 
has actually incurred $100,000 of tax liability. To report such a high number 
on his Form 1040 would be a drastic departure from his behavior during the 
year and would subject him to estimated tax penalties for failing to report 
____________________________________________________________ 
 167 IRS, Tax Gap “Map” (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax_gap_
map_2006.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/R2QJ-HR2Z?type=pdf ($122 billion of unpaid tax on 
individual business income and $57 billion of unpaid self-employment tax). 
 168 See generally I.R.C. § 6654 (2012) (providing that estimated tax payments are due on 
April 15, June 15, September 15, and January 15).  
 169 I.R.C. § 6654(d)(1). The ninety percent threshold is increased to 110% for taxpayers with 
net income over $150,000 in the prior year. Id. 
 170 It may be the case that estimated taxes, by their very nature, contribute to tax evasion be-
cause they allow taxpayers to more easily categorize underreporting at the time of the estimated 
tax payment as something other than cheating. For example, a taxpayer might tell herself that she 
is not cheating at the time of the quarterly payment because she can make it up later by fully re-
porting at the end of the year. When the end of the year comes, however, that same taxpayer likely 
will not want to make up for any underreporting during the year because doing so may subject her 
to an estimated tax penalty. 
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more income during the year. It would seem, in this example, that the poli-
cies to induce honesty came into the picture too late for this taxpayer. 
To avoid this problem, policymakers should focus on inducing honesty 
at the time that self-employed taxpayers are likely to make a meaningful 
decision about whether to be honest—when making estimated tax pay-
ments—rather than at the time of filing the year-end tax return. Currently, 
taxpayers who owe estimated taxes are required only to submit payments on 
a quarterly basis, either through the mail, by phone, or electronically, and 
are not required to submit and sign a form until they file their annual tax 
return on Form 1040. For example, taxpayers who mail in their estimated 
tax payments are instructed to fill out and return an estimated payment 
voucher, which requires identifying information but does not require a sig-
nature.171 Taxpayers can also forgo completing estimated payment vouchers 
by paying their estimated taxes online using the Electronic Federal Tax 
Payment System.172 Accordingly, the IRS would likely have to alter the cur-
rent system to incorporate mindfulness or other honesty-inducing policies 
into process of paying estimated taxes. 
The IRS could incorporate many of the above-described policies into 
the estimated tax process. Taxpayers could be required to sign a statement 
on an estimated tax voucher verifying that the submitted amount is an hon-
est and good faith estimate of the taxpayer’s income. Or, for those paying 
electronically, they could be required to electronically sign a statement or 
type out a jurat, check boxes verifying accuracy, read statements about tax 
evasion, or fill out a brief survey along the lines suggested above. By call-
ing attention to taxpayers’ moral standards, the presence of a victim of tax 
evasion, or both at the time of the estimated tax payments, policymakers 
may be able to raise the psychic cost of tax evasion at the most meaningful 
time for self-employed taxpayers.173 
____________________________________________________________ 
 171 See IRS Form 1040-ES, Estimated Tax For Individuals (2013), available at http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040es.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V8S5-QVFV. 
 172 See EFTPS (Electronic Federal Tax Payment System) website, at https://www.eftps.gov/
eftps/, archived at https://perma.cc/NF9W-24P6?type=image (last visited Feb. 21, 2015). A tax-
payer can also avoid filling out a payment voucher by paying estimated taxes over the phone. See 
IRS Form 1040-ES, supra note 171. 
 173 Such policies likely would be most effective as new taxpayers enter the system, rather than 
at targeting established self-employed individuals who have a long history of underreporting sig-
nificant amounts of income. For the latter group, even if honest-inducing policies did increase the 
psychic cost of evasion, entrenched behavior might be difficult to change. For example, a rational 
small business owner with a history of evasion might think that suddenly reporting higher amounts 
of income would attract an IRS audit. 
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4. Focus on Tax Return Preparers 
Undoubtedly, some taxpayers would be unaffected by the policies de-
scribed above because they turn to a tax professional to prepare and file 
their tax returns. Given that tax professionals prepare more than half of tax 
returns,174 efforts should be made to induce honesty among return preparers. 
The credentials and training of professional tax return preparers vary. 
Some are certified public accountants (CPAs) or lawyers. Others may be en-
rolled agents175 or registered tax return preparers,176 individuals who are nei-
ther lawyers nor CPAs but who have passed a competency exam that allows 
them to practice before the IRS. Regardless of credentials, all individuals 
who prepare tax returns for compensation must register with the IRS and 
obtain a Preparer Tax Identification Number,177 and all such individuals are 
subject to ethical guidelines under what is known as “Circular 230.” 
Circular 230 is a set of Treasury regulations that govern many aspects of 
professional tax practice, including return preparation.178 Among other guide-
lines, Circular 230 provides ethical standards and duties for tax return prepar-
ers. For example, if a tax return preparer has knowledge that a client has 
omitted income from a tax return, the preparer must advise the client of the 
legal consequences of the omission.179 A preparer also must exercise due dili-
gence as to the accuracy of the tax returns that she prepares.180 Failure to 
comply with Circular 230 may result in censure, suspension, or disbar-
ment.181 
____________________________________________________________ 
 174 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 175 Enrolled agents must either pass a three-part exam or have prior experience as an employ-
ee of the IRS. They must also complete 72 hours of continuing education every three years. Like 
CPAs, enrolled agents can represent taxpayers in certain disputes with the IRS, such as during the 
course of an audit. See IRS, Enrolled Agent Information, http://www.irs.gov/Tax-Professionals/
Enrolled-Agents/Enrolled-Agent-Information, archived at http://perma.cc/5Q7H-UZUR (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2015). 
 176 Registered return preparers must also pass a competency exam, but their rights to give 
advice or represent individuals beyond the preparation of a tax return are narrower than those of 
enrolled agents. See IRS Publ’n 947, Practice Before the IRS, 3 (May 2012), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p947.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9NUV-V6JS. This is not an ex-
haustive list of lay individuals who are authorized to practice before the IRS. Other permissible 
categories include enrolled actuaries, students under supervision, and unenrolled agents. See id. 
 177 See IRS, PTIN Requirements for Tax Return Preparers, http://www.irs.gov/Tax-Profession
als/PTIN-Requirements-for-Tax-Return-Preparers, archived at http://perma.cc/5PAU-6JEP (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2015). 
 178 31 C.F.R. § 10 (2014). Circular 230 covers, among other individuals, attorneys, CPAs, 
enrolled agents, and registered tax return preparers. Id. §§ 10.0, 10.3. 
 179 See id. § 10.21. 
 180 See id. § 10.22. 
 181 See id. § 10.50. Tax return preparers also subject themselves to potential civil penalties 
and criminal sanctions for signing returns that they know to be false or fraudulent. See, e.g., I.R.C. 
§ 6694 (2012) (civil penalty for understatement of taxpayer’s tax liability by return preparer); id. 
§ 7206 (criminal sanctions for preparation of a false or fraudulent return). 
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Despite the fact that tax return preparers are subject to ethical stand-
ards, some preparers likely play a role, whether active or passive, in tax 
evasion among taxpayers. For example, one field study of tax evasion 
among cash businesses found that many return preparers had implicit un-
derstandings with their clients about unreported cash income and adopted a 
“don’t ask don’t tell” approach.182 Other preparers in the study played a 
more active role in their client’s tax evasion, for example, by helping to 
prepare a false set of books to back up what was reported on the taxpayer’s 
return.183 While many tax return preparers are honest, it is worthwhile to 
consider policies that would seek to induce honesty among less honest tax 
professionals. 
As one possibility, the Treasury and the IRS could subject tax profes-
sionals who are otherwise governed by Circular 230 to an honor code. 
Many universities, for example, employ honor codes to reduce cheating 
among students when they take examinations. As discussed above, studies 
have indicated that signing an honor code immediately before performing a 
task with a very low risk of detection for cheating reduces cheating to the 
same level as when subjects were exposed to a very high risk of detec-
tion.184 In other words, honor codes have been shown to be a very effective 
method of reducing cheating when there is a high opportunity to cheat by 
raising the psychic cost. 
In a similar manner, if tax return preparers were required to sign an 
honor code in connection with each tax return that they prepared, the psy-
chic cost of dishonest reporting185 might be higher, resulting in more accu-
rate returns. The statement of the honor code could be brief and should not 
be a cumbersome addition to certifying preparation of a client’s tax return. 
The honor code statement might be a short summary of the ethical standards 
under Circular 230, a brief reminder of the potential sanctions for preparing 
a false or fraudulent return, or both. To mitigate desensitization that might 
occur after signing the honor code numerous times, the IRS might vary its 
contents from year-to-year and keep it brief.186 
____________________________________________________________ 
 182 See Susan Cleary Morse et al., Closing the Tax Gap: Cash Business and Tax Evasion, 20 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 43, 59–60 (2009). 
 183 See id. at 60–61. The study generally involved prepares with a substantial cash business 
clientele. 
 184 See supra notes 136–137 and accompanying text. 
 185 This would be aimed at preparers who have knowledge of, or having willingly turned a 
blind eye to, their clients’ dishonest reporting. 
 186 Some degree of desensitization to an honor code or a similar mechanism is likely inevita-
ble, among both tax return preparers and taxpayers. Another useful area of further empirical study 
would be how the effects of honesty-inducing policies, like calling attention to moral standards, 
persist over time. 
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Another, even simpler approach would be to simply move the current 
tax return preparer signature line to the top of the tax form, as suggested for 
taxpayers above. Currently, a paid tax return preparer must sign the bottom 
of Form 1040, directly underneath the taxpayer’s signature. Moving the 
signature line to the top could call attention to moral standards and positive-
ly influence tax return preparers in the same way it could influence taxpay-
ers. 
5. Creating a Salient “Victim” of Tax Evasion 
As discussed above in Part II, empirical studies have demonstrated that 
the psychic cost of dishonesty increases when individuals perceive that a 
victim will suffer economic harm as a result of their dishonesty.187 Indeed, 
one factor that may strongly contribute to tax evasion is the fact that indi-
viduals may view it as a victimless crime, thus allowing them to incur a 
lower psychic cost when they cheat on their taxes. To counteract this effect, 
policymakers should strive to make salient to taxpayers that tax evasion is 
not, in fact, a victimless crime. By identifying specific economic harms im-
posed on individuals as a result of tax noncompliance, policymakers may be 
able to raise the psychic cost of tax evasion and reduce cheating. 
Who are the “victims” of tax evasion? With the exception of certain 
excise taxes,188 most federal taxes collected from individuals are not desig-
nated for specific purposes and go to the general revenue fund. In the 
broadest sense, any person who benefits from government spending is po-
tentially deprived when there is a shortfall in tax revenue collected. Addi-
tionally, anyone who pays taxes is likely subject to a higher nominal tax rate 
to compensate for the tax gap.189 This breadth of potential victims is benefi-
cial to policymakers because they can choose to focus on any number of 
government spending programs in identifying specific economic harm re-
sulting from tax evasion. 
Policymakers should start, then, by identifying government programs 
that have the broadest public support. For example, data shows that the ma-
jority of Americans oppose cuts to federal spending on education, jobs pro-
grams, and food stamps (among other areas).190 Policymakers could then 
____________________________________________________________ 
 187 See supra notes 109–117 and accompanying text. 
 188 For example, revenues from the federal gasoline tax are dedicated to the Highway Trust 
Fund. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, JCX-2-13R, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYS-
TEM AS IN EFFECT FOR 2013, at 18 (Jan. 8, 2013). 
 189 This would not necessarily be the case if the government used all of the additional revenue 
raised from increased tax compliance to increase spending, rather than lower taxes. 
 190 See Harris Interactive, Cutting Government Spending May Be Popular but There Is Little 
Appetite for Cutting Specific Government Programs (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.harrisinteractive.
com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/mid/1508/articleId/693/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/Default.
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identify specific cuts that have been made to popular programs within these 
areas, for example, a popular education program benefitting school children 
that has been cut due to lack of funding. By focusing on discrete and sym-
pathetic groups that could benefit from increased tax revenue, policymakers 
can hone in on a more visible “victim” of tax evasion. 
In addition to identifying victims of tax evasion, policymakers must be 
able to make potential tax evaders aware of such victims, which could be 
accomplished in several ways. For example, the IRS might run a media 
campaign, akin to public service announcements, via television or the Inter-
net.191 A brief advertisement might focus on a real locality that experienced 
a cut to an educational program, feature affected families and teachers, and 
present a message that every dollar of unreported income tax takes away 
funding from programs like the one featured.192 In addition to television, the 
IRS might display the advertisement on its website and on websites that 
provide tax preparation software, so that taxpayers will view them when 
preparing their tax returns.193 
The IRS could also combine messages intended to highlight victims of 
tax evasion with messages intended to call attention to moral standards, as 
discussed above. For example, taxpayers might have to read statements or 
take surveys in connection with filing their tax return that point out particu-
lar programs that are affected by revenue shortfalls. The statements should 
point out that tax evasion directly impacts such revenue shortfalls. For ex-
ample, a statement might read: 
                                                                                                                           
aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/2U45-HKYB (last visited Feb. 22, 2015) (cited in Listokin & 
Schizer, supra note 38, at 200) (arguing that policymakers should link taxes with popular govern-
ment programs to encourage compliance). In contrast, a majority of Americans support cuts in 
federal spending on foreign economic aid, foreign military aid, and space programs. See Harris 
Interactive, supra. 
 191 Other scholars have also advocated the use of media campaigns to improve tax compli-
ance. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 38, at 634–36 (recommending, among other strategies, 
media campaigns to improve taxpayer morale); Susan Morse, Using Salience and Influence to 
Narrow the Tax Gap, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 483, 504–07 (2009) (suggesting focusing on public 
goods provided by taxes as a means of fostering social norms of tax compliance). 
 192 For example, the news media has covered recent cuts to popular programs like Head Start, 
which provides education and nutrition services to low-income children. See Christin Nance Laz-
erus, Federal Budget Cuts Mean Reductions in Local Head Start Programs, POST TRIB. (Sept. 20, 
2013), available at http://posttrib.suntimes.com/news/porter/22624656-418/federal-budget-cuts-
mean-reductions-in-local-head-start-programs.html, archived at https://perma.cc/VA69-B85J?type=
pdf. The message would have to be sufficiently broad so as not to mislead the public into thinking 
that specific tax dollars were set aside for the featured program. 
 193 The IRS has relied on publicity to encourage compliance in other contexts. See, e.g., Josh-
ua D. Blank & Daniel Z. Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized? 30 VA. TAX REV. 1, 2–5 
(2010) (providing evidence of a significant increase in IRS press releases regarding enforcement 
activities in early April, presumably geared towards tax-filing season). 
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In 2013, funding was cut to a number of Head Start Programs 
across the country due to revenue shortfalls in the federal budget, 
resulting in hundreds of thousands194 of low-income children fail-
ing to receive access to essential educational and nutritional sup-
port. Every dollar of tax that goes unreported by U.S. taxpayers 
directly harms government programs like Head Start. 
By focusing taxpayers’ attention on individuals who would be harmed by 
tax evasion, such policies could make the psychic cost of cheating higher 
and deter noncompliance. 
A potential limitation of this approach is that it would require a critical 
mass of taxpayers to support the government programs highlighted. As dis-
cussed above, there is evidence that some government programs enjoy 
abundant popular support.195 For some taxpayers, however, messages about 
government spending to benefit any needy group may have no effect on 
their compliance decisions. Or, worse, such messages could breed resent-
ment in taxpayers who generally do not support tax funding of social pro-
grams, which could encourage even lower tax compliance. Such an effect 
could offset compliance benefits obtained from those who were positively 
influenced by the messages. Further, as an empirical matter, it might be dif-
ficult to determine which government spending programs would be rein-
stated and which would continue to be defunded in the event that more tax 
revenue was generated by higher tax compliance. Taxpayers might thus view 
the suggested link between tax compliance and highlighted victims as too 
attenuated or even misleading. 
This is a delicate area where a particularly thorough amount of empiri-
cal testing would need to be undertaken to determine if the compliance ben-
efits obtained outweighed any potential compliance costs. Policymakers 
might also have better success in portraying potential victims of tax compli-
ance in a less political way. For example, the IRS might simply highlight 
that tax evasion causes honest taxpayers to pay more taxes.196 
B. Directions for Future Research 
To successfully raise tax compliance by increasing the psychic cost of 
tax evasion, further study remains to determine which behavioral nudges 
would be most effective in the tax compliance context and whether they 
could be implemented in a cost-effective manner. This Section discusses po-
tential policies that could be tested both in laboratory settings and through 
____________________________________________________________ 
 194 This total is hypothetical—a reliable estimate presumably could be determined by the 
government. 
 195 See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 196 But see supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
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small-scale field studies of actual taxpayers. Such studies could be conduct-
ed at the federal level by the IRS, but could also be conducted by states or 
localities. This Section also describes the success of other countries, such as 
the United Kingdom and Denmark, in implementing the findings of behav-
ioral economics into government policies involving taxation. 
1. Laboratory Studies 
First, substantively, the application of (1) attention to moral standards, 
(2) categorization, and (3) the presence of a victim to tax compliance merits 
further research. With the exception of one study of the effect of physically 
signing a form at the top on tax reporting,197 most of the above-described 
empirical work on honesty has involved contexts other than tax compliance. 
Similar lab studies could be designed to determine whether results from 
studies involving cheating on various tasks could be replicated in studies 
involving reporting income on a tax return. For example, lab studies on cat-
egorization have demonstrated that subjects cheat more on problem-solving 
tasks when they are rewarded with tokens (that can be redeemed for cash) 
as opposed to cash.198 Researchers could design a similar cash/token study 
that instead involved tax reporting. For example, subjects could claim vari-
ous deductions (e.g., for their travel expenses) that would increase or de-
crease the amount of tax refund they are rewarded. The results could be 
compared among subjects who are paid an immediate cash refund versus 
those who are paid in tokens exchangeable at a later time for cash. A finding 
that tokens led to more cheating might aid in our understanding of the role 
categorization plays in tax compliance currently.  
Of equal importance is further research on the efficacy of honesty-
inducing policies in settings that reflect real world taxpayer behavior. More 
study is particularly merited with respect to potential differences in compli-
ance among paper filers and electronic filers. For example, rather than 
simply testing whether a physical signature at the top of a tax return would 
increase tax compliance, studies should also focus on whether electronic 
signatures or checking a box next to an “I agree” statement before electron-
ically preparing a tax return have the same honesty-inducing effect. Studies 
where subjects prepare fictitious tax returns by hand could be replicated 
with simple electronic preparation at a computer. Additionally, researchers 
should examine whether brief surveys induce honesty by calling attention to 
moral standards in the same manner that signing a form does. 
Although lab studies of taxpayer behavior have potential drawbacks, 
the upsides make them a valuable tool in this context. Such studies would 
____________________________________________________________ 
 197 Supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 198 Supra notes 104–107 and accompanying text. 
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allow researchers to isolate specific factors in a controlled environment free 
of many complications that actual taxpayers face, such as liquidity prob-
lems or other economic factors.199 For example, researchers who want to 
examine the effect of electronic signing versus physical signing can more 
carefully equalize the conditions between those that electronically sign, 
physically sign, and control subjects who do not sign at all to minimize the 
influence of additional factors on the results. 
Notwithstanding these benefits, a common critique of laboratory stud-
ies of taxpayer behavior is that student subjects do not behave in the same 
manner that an adult taxpayer would, and that subjects may generally be-
have differently in a lab.200 For example, it’s possible that subjects are more 
compliant in laboratory tests of tax compliance because they feel more 
closely monitored, or because they want to please the researchers conduct-
ing the study.201 Evidence shows, however, that the behavior of student sub-
jects does not deviate significantly from that of adults.202 Additionally, re-
sults of lab studies of tax compliance have generally been found to be con-
sistent with IRS data on actual taxpayer behavior,203 indicating that there is 
not significant deviation from real world behavior when testing tax compli-
ance in a laboratory setting. 
2. Pilot Programs 
Lab studies of various methods of inducing honesty are only the first 
step in successfully implementing policies designed to increase the psychic 
cost of tax evasion. Even in light of evidence that laboratory studies of tax-
payer behavior are consistent with real world behavior, care should be taken 
to determine whether the results of honesty studies are relevant to actual 
taxpayers operating outside of a controlled setting. Thus, the next step 
should be government testing through small-scale pilot programs, where 
specific policies are implemented among test groups in randomized con-
trolled trials.204 Such trials could be conducted by the IRS at the national 
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 199 See, e.g., James Alm, Testing Behavioral Public Economic Theories in the Laboratory, 63 
NAT’L TAX J. 635, 641 (2010). 
 200 See id. at 641–42. However, not all lab studies involve student subjects.  
 201 See id. at 642. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id.; see also Thomas, supra note 5, 136–39 (noting that the results of lab studies showing 
higher tax compliance among taxpayers claiming refunds is consistent with results of studies of 
IRS audit data on actual taxpayers). 
 204 Scholars argue that any behavioral interventions should be tested first through pilot pro-
grams “given the complexity of conditions, the high uncertainty, and in particular given the in-
credible [potential] cost of implementing policy.” Amir et al., supra note 134, at 451. They also 
note that pilot testing is particularly appropriate for tax reform, given the potential revenue 
gain/loss at stake: “How is it that the government cuts taxes by billions of dollars without any pilot 
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level, or even at state or local levels. For example, the IRS (or an analogous 
local taxing authority) might identify 3000 individuals who self-prepare 
their tax returns electronically. Of those individuals, half (1500) might be 
exposed to the current method of electronically signing their return after it 
has been completed, while the other half might be asked to electronically 
sign or verify an accuracy statement before proceeding to fill out the elec-
tronic form. The results could be analyzed by determining whether there 
was an overall increase in reported income (compared to the prior year) 
among those who signed before as compared to those who signed after they 
completed the form. Like the Schwartz and Orleans study on the effect of 
personal norms on taxpayer compliance,205 taxpayer confidentiality could 
be maintained by reporting results on a group-wide, rather than individual, 
basis. 
Implementing honesty-inducing policies through small pilot programs 
would allow policymakers to experiment with a variety of different tech-
niques to determine what works and what does not without expending the 
resources necessary to implement a full-scale change. Additionally, some 
measures like simply changing the placement of a signature line on an elec-
tronic or paper form would not require much additional cost no matter what 
the size of the study. Due to their advantages, randomized controlled trials 
have been successfully implemented to determine effective policies in other 
fields such as criminal law,206 health care,207 and welfare policy.208 
3. Similar Approaches in Other Countries 
The United Kingdom has already begun implementing honesty-inducing 
policies on a small scale in an effort to decrease fraud and error in the tax 
system and in other areas. The government’s “Behavioural Insights Team,” 
a special coalition designed to apply findings from behavioral economics 
                                                                                                                           
test? Why not give the residents of Rhode Island (just as an example) one of four levels of tax cuts 
for a year or two and see the effect? Wouldn’t this be much more efficient and beneficial in the 
long run?” Id. 
 205 Supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text. 
 206 See Lawrence W. Sherman, The Rise of Evidenced-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, 
and Tracking, 42 CRIME & JUST. 377, 409 (2013) (noting that randomized trials of juvenile of-
fenders showed that prosecuting after arrest led to more repeat offenses than those who were “di-
verted or cautioned”). 
 207 Global HIV Prevention Working Group, HIV/AIDS and the Global Community: Global 
Mobilization for HIV Prevention: A Blueprint for Action, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 297, 315 n.42 
(2002) (discussing randomized trials showing efficacy of safe sex programs in preventing HIV). 
 208 Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy, Social Programs That Work: Minnesota Family In-
vestment Program, http://evidencebasedprograms.org/1366-2/minnesota-family-investment-program, 
archived at http://perma.cc/2U45-HKYB (last visited Feb. 21, 2015) (noting that successful welfare 
pilot program in Minnesota instituted in seven counties led to eventual enactment of program by the 
state). 
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research to public policy, published a report in 2012 describing the results 
of some of these studies.209 One trial was undertaken to gauge the effect of 
“signing at the top” of forms, based on the empirical research described in 
Part II above, including the auto insurance study.210 This trial, conducted by 
the Behavioural Insights Team in partnership with the Manchester City 
Council, examined the claiming of Single Person Discounts, which entitle 
people living alone to a twenty-five percent discount on their local council 
tax.211 The government has estimated that UK-wide losses due to individu-
als falsely claiming a Single Person Discount are potentially as high as £100 
million.212 
In 2011, the Manchester City Council sent approximately 38,000 let-
ters to residents who had claimed a Single Person discount the previous 
year. The letter requested that residents complete a form on the reverse side 
to claim the Single Person Discount if they were still living alone.213 Some 
residents received the original letter that had been sent in previous years, 
while others received a new letter with a required signature at the top of the 
form.214 The new letter resulted in a six percent reduction in requests to re-
new the Single Person Discount as compared to the original letter,215 saving 
the city council an estimated £240,000216 in one year for an essentially cost-
less change. 
Additionally, a coalition similar to the Behavioural Insights Team 
called the “INudgeYou Team” in Denmark has worked with the Danish 
Ministry of Taxation to incorporate the findings of behavioral economics 
into policies that will improve tax compliance. One intervention sought to 
address difficulties that the Ministry of Taxation was having collecting tax 
from young people ages fifteen to twenty-five.217 After interviewing a num-
ber of young taxpayers, and studying the online behavior of youth on web-
sites such as Facebook, the INudgeYou Team found that redesigning the 
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 209 Cabinet Office, Behavioural Insights Team, Applying Behavioural Insights to Reduce 
Fraud, Error and Debt, 3 (Feb. 2012) available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
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Ministry’s website to make it more relatable and familiar was key to en-
couraging better tax compliance among young people. The changes were 
described as “an adaptation of a visual universe that the target group knew 
and understood from the online world they were familiar with.”218 As was 
the case with the behavioral interventions in the UK, the INudgeYou Team’s 
policies produced a measureable increase in tax compliance among Den-
mark’s youth.219 
C. Addressing Potential Objections 
Incorporating the findings of behavioral economics into government 
policies is not without controversy. Critics have argued that such policies 
lack robust empirical support, lack a solid theoretical underpinning, and are 
unduly paternalistic. Critics may also argue that increasing the psychic cost 
of tax evasion imposes collateral costs on the tax system that outweigh its 
benefits. This Section addresses some of those concerns. 
1. Honesty-Inducing Policies Lack Sufficient Empirical Support 
A primary criticism of behavioral law and economics is that the results 
of laboratory experiments often lack real world relevance.220 The behavioral 
nudges proposed in this Article are susceptible to this argument that such 
policies simply will not work in the real world. For example, one oft-cited 
failed tax policy based on behavioral economics was the implementation of 
the Making Work Pay Credit, which was a fiscal stimulus intended to jump 
start a faltering economy by distributing up to $400 to qualifying individu-
als ($800 for married couples) in 2009 and 2010.221 Whereas previous, simi-
lar stimuli had been distributed as a lump sum check, the Making Work Pay 
Credit was administered incrementally through the tax system, by decreas-
ing the amount of tax withheld in each paycheck that the individual re-
ceived.222 The change was based on a theory put forth by behavioral econ-
omists that individuals would be more likely to spend, and less likely to 
save, the extra income if they received it in small increments over time, ra-
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ther than as a lump sum.223 A subsequent survey of recipients showed that 
the change in distribution of the credit was unlikely to achieve the intended 
result, with only thirteen percent of households reporting that they intended 
to spend the stimulus money in 2009, compared to twenty-five percent who 
reported spending a 2008 lump sum rebate check.224 Apparently the incre-
mental distributions for the Making Work Pay Credit were so small that 
many individuals reported that they did not even notice the extra income 
and, thus, did not make plans to spend it.225 Many commentators thus 
viewed the program as a failure and waste of government spending.226 
Similarly, critics could argue that attempting to translate the results of 
the honesty studies discussed above into policy would be a waste of gov-
ernment resources. The previous Subsection addresses the argument that the 
empirical studies showing that honesty can be influenced through external 
factors lack real world application. There is at least some evidence that lab 
studies of taxpayer behavior are reliable indicators of actual taxpayer be-
havior,227 and, more importantly, policies can and should be first tested 
through pilot programs to determine their external validity. Such trials 
would not impose onerous administrative costs due to their small size, and 
many of the proposed interventions would be so minor (e.g., moving a sig-
nature line) that they would require minimal costs in any event. A similar 
pilot program approach could have potentially saved substantial costs in the 
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 223 Id. at 4–5; see also Drake Bennett, Behavioral Economics Foils an Obama Tax Cut?, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/behavioral-
economics-foils-an-obama-tax-cut-11102011.html#p1, archived at http://perma.cc/4JFY-9933. One 
theory that supported the approach taken by the Making Work Pay Credit was Richard Thaler’s 
theory of “mental accounts.” Bennett, supra. According to Thaler, individuals tend to separate 
financial resources into various mental accounts, including a “current income” account and an 
“asset” account. See Richard Thaler, Anomalies: Saving, Fungibility, and Mental Accounts, 4 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 193, 194–95 (1990). Small gains tend to be treated as current income and are more 
likely to be spent. Larger gains tend to be treated as assets and are more likely to be saved. Id. 
 224 Sahm et al., supra note 222, at 7–11. 
 225 Id. at 8–10. The study does have limitations, and it is not clear that the Making Work Pay 
Credit did not have a positive impact on the economy. For example, the data came from taxpayer 
surveys, which were conducted before all of the 2009 payments had been made. Accepting the 
accuracy of the responses requires assuming that individuals keep track of and accurately report 
their spending behavior, and further assuming that they are able to accurately predict how they 
will behave in the future. See Bennett, supra note 223. 
 Additionally, the outcome of the study conducted by Sahm, Shapiro, and Slemrod suggests 
that policymakers were wrong in their prediction of how individuals would respond to small, in-
cremental stimulus payments, but it does not suggest that behavioral economics does not factor 
into this context. Under a purely rational model, it should make no difference in terms of con-
sumption patterns if a credit is distributed in a lump sum or incrementally. That twice as much 
spending was reported to have taken place under a lump sum stimulus versus an incremental stim-
ulus suggests that individuals are still exhibiting irrational behavior. See id. 
 226 See, e.g., Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 220, at 1066; Bennett, supra note 223. 
 227 Supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
2015] The Psychic Cost of Tax Evasion 665 
case of the Making Work Pay Credit. Some policies inevitably will not 
work as intended, and pilot testing before they are implemented on a wide 
scale will prevent the government from wasting precious resources. 
2. Honesty-Inducing Policies Lack Sufficient Theoretical Support 
Another major criticism of behavioral law and economics is that there 
is no coherent underlying theoretical model on which to base behavioral 
policies.228 Whereas neoclassical economics starts from the premise of a 
rational actor who behaves predictably, the argument here is that behavioral 
economics results in a number of different models explaining various 
anomalies in individual behavior without one, unifying theory.229 
The proposals herein are potentially susceptible to the critique that 
they lack comprehensive theoretical support. Recall that Part III modifies 
the standard deterrence model of tax evasion by incorporating a psychic 
cost of tax evasion, Z. This updated model incorporates empirical evidence 
showing that individuals are deterred from cheating not only by monetary 
costs, but by psychological costs, as well. However, this updated model is 
not—nor does it claim to be—a comprehensive model of an individual’s 
decision-making process in the context of tax compliance. Just as the neo-
classical model does not (nor does it intend to) incorporate non-rational as-
pects of human behavior, an updated model reflecting the psychic cost of 
tax evasion inevitably omits a number of other facets of decision-making in 
the tax compliance context, such as the effect of social norms. Further, as 
discussed above, it is likely impossible to model the psychic cost of tax eva-
sion with any degree of precision because individual thresholds for psychic 
cost likely vary from person-to-person. Additionally, the factors discussed 
in this Article—attention to moral standards, categorization, and the pres-
ence of a victim—are no doubt just a few of a multitude of factors that in-
fluence the psychic cost of evasion. 
But the lack of a comprehensive and unified behavioral model of tax 
evasion does not detract from the merit of implementing cost-effective tax 
policies that induce honesty. Although one behavioral theory or model will 
not fit all individuals,230 adopting policies based on solid empirical evidence 
may still alter the behavior of a significant number of individuals. If the 
marginal cost of implementing such policies is exceeded by the marginal 
gains resulting from improved tax compliance, then policymakers should be 
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able to raise tax revenue efficiently.231 Additionally, concerns that the lack 
of a unified theoretical model leads to bad policies in practice232 can be re-
duced by first pilot-testing those policies in real world settings to determine 
their impact. 
3. Raising the Psychic Cost of Tax Evasion Could Impose Unintended 
Costs 
Critics might also argue that, even if the empirical and theoretical sup-
port for raising the psychic cost of tax evasion is sound, such policies could 
impose unintended costs that would outweigh their benefits. As discussed 
above, many of the policies proposed in this Article should impose only 
minor administrative costs on the government and, because the goal would 
be to collect additional tax revenue through enhanced tax compliance, this 
additional revenue effectively should pay for these policies. But, even if the 
administrative costs to the government of implementing such policies were 
outweighed by additional tax revenue, there could be additional, collateral 
costs imposed on the tax system. For example, honesty-inducing policies 
could lead to lower compliance among some taxpayers over time if they 
created backlash.233 Taxpayers might resent government efforts to nudge 
behavior or feel that the government’s resort to such tactics lessens its cred-
ibility. Such policies might also encourage lower compliance if taxpayers 
believe adoption of the policies signals that the IRS’s current deterrence 
efforts are ineffective. Additionally, such policies could create complexities 
in tax return preparation that raise compliance costs for taxpayers. 
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All policies designed to deter tax evasion carry some risk of taxpayer 
resentment and backlash.234 For example, research shows that when tax 
penalties are set too high, taxpayers may be less likely to comply with their 
tax obligations.235 Yet, there is no reason that the honesty-inducing policies 
proposed in this Article would carry a greater risk of creating taxpayer 
backlash than current policies designed to increase tax compliance like tax 
penalties and audits.236 In fact, the honesty-inducing policies, by their very 
nature, are designed to be subtle nudges that increase voluntary compliance 
among taxpayers and, as such, they should carry a lower risk of crowding 
out voluntary compliance than policies designed to punish.237 For example, 
many taxpayers might not even notice that their signature is required before 
filling out their tax return instead of after. For potentially controversial poli-
cies that aim to create a salient victim of tax evasion by highlighting items 
of government spending (e.g., spending on healthcare), policymakers 
should first experiment with various messages to determine which minimize 
taxpayer resentment. 
There is also no reason that honesty-inducing policies should create 
significant complexity or administrative costs for taxpayers. Requiring sig-
natures where they weren’t previously required (e.g., with estimated tax 
payments), requiring taxpayers to read brief statements, or requiring tax-
payers to take brief surveys will add only minimal time to tax preparation. 
Nothing will change in the overall design of tax returns that would add sig-
nificant additional complexity or costs to tax compliance, nor will any sub-
stantive tax laws change. 
In all events, the costs of imposing policies designed to increase the 
psychic cost of tax evasion would certainly have to be weighed against the 
benefits. And, the lack of a comprehensive theoretical model of tax compli-
ance makes it difficult to quantify these costs. But we lack a comprehensive 
model of the costs of our tax policies regardless of whether we incorporate 
behavioral interventions. The social costs of policies like tax audits or tax 
penalties are also hard to quantify, and it is possible that these policies also 
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create lower compliance among some taxpayers238 or increased complexity 
in the tax system. There is no reason, then, to favor current policies with 
unknown costs over newer policies with unknown costs if it turns out there 
is good empirical support for the latter. Although tax policymakers must 
strive for an educated understanding of potential costs of new policies, we 
should not shut out innovations that could raise much needed tax revenue 
because we cannot quantify the potential costs with precision. 
4. Behavioral Interventions Are Unduly Paternalistic 
Critics of applying behavioral economics to government policies have 
also argued that these types of interventions are overly paternalistic and 
falsely assume that regulators understand individuals’ true preferences.239 
For example, another recent behavioral intervention was the “Save More 
Tomorrow” program, which allowed employers to change the default for 
employer-sponsored savings plans to automatic enrollment, so that individ-
uals would have to affirmatively opt out of the plans, instead of having to 
opt in.240 The idea, which was pioneered by behavioral economists, is that 
individuals exhibit a “status quo bias” that causes them to adhere to the sta-
tus quo even if it does not represent their true preferences.241 By changing 
the status quo to enrollment in savings plans, policymakers have succeeded 
in raising the rate of savings when the program has been adopted.242 Critics, 
however, have argued that these changes do not necessary represent indi-
viduals’ “true” preferences, but instead merely substitute regulators’ prefer-
ences for those of individuals.243 Such policies, the critics argue, are not 
only prone to error in judging individual preferences, but rest on a slippery 
slope that could lead to continued, over-intrusive regulation.244 
It is not necessary for purposes of this Article to resolve the debate 
over regulations that aim to correct cognitive errors that purportedly cause 
people to deviate from their true preferences. Enrollment in savings plans, 
like other areas that have been traditionally subject to behavioral interven-
tions,245 represents behavior that is truly optional. Thus, a colorable argu-
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ment could be made that individual liberty may be at stake when regulators 
interfere with such behavior.246 And such interventions require policy deci-
sions to be made ahead of time (e.g., that enrollment in savings plans is 
good and we want to encourage it) about which there may not be a consen-
sus. 
This Article, however, advocates behavioral interventions to encourage 
individuals to comply with their tax liability. Individuals are not at liberty to 
evade taxes from a legal perspective (though they may do so anyway), and 
thus there is no freedom of choice interest to be protected in this context.247 
Even if it is rational for individuals to evade tax from an economic perspec-
tive, we have already made a policy decision—evidenced by our substantive 
tax laws and procedural mechanisms like audits and penalties—that paying 
taxes is not voluntary. Thus, applying behavioral economics in this context, 
by incorporating honesty-inducing policies to encourage higher tax compli-
ance, should not raise concerns of paternalism. 
CONCLUSION 
The tax gap presents the government with a formidable task. We are 
losing hundreds of billions of dollars of tax revenue each year due to rela-
tively minor amounts of tax evasion by a significant number of taxpayers. 
In the aggregate, these sums are quite costly, but enforcement on the indi-
vidual level is often not cost-effective. Auditing more individuals is likely 
unrealistic given budgetary limitations and would be politically unpopular 
even in better economic times. Raising tax penalties faces similar limita-
tions. Without ramping up efforts in these traditional deterrence-driven are-
as, what can the government do to reign in tax evasion? 
There is no time like the present for the IRS to innovate. Not only are 
we in need of additional tax revenue, but the past several decades have seen 
important contributions by psychologists and behavioral economists to our 
understanding of what drives individuals to be dishonest. Importantly, there 
is much data indicating that honesty is not a fixed trait within an individual 
but, rather, can be influenced by external factors. The IRS can and should 
use this knowledge to increase tax compliance by raising the psychic cost of 
tax evasion. 
There is, of course, no guarantee that honesty-inducing policies like 
signing a form at the top instead of the bottom can be translated into effec-
tive policies for actual taxpayers. But many of those policies could be im-
plemented at such a low administrative cost to the government, particularly 
____________________________________________________________ 
 246 The counterargument is that “those who feel strongly about their own choices can easily 
overcome the government’s default.” Galle, supra note 231, at 855. 
 247 See Thomas, supra note 5, at 164. 
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compared to raising audit rates or penalties, that it is certainly worth inves-
tigating their potential. Using some of the behavioral nudges proposed in 
this Article, the IRS could pilot test the efficacy of raising the psychic cost 
of tax evasion and determine the best manner to do so before implementing 
any changes on broad scale. Even minor changes, such as making small 
adjustments to the way that taxpayers fill out their tax form, could generate 
much needed tax revenue at virtually no administrative cost to the govern-
ment. 

  
 
